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STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
Consistent with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1) and (b), the caption of this case contains 
a complete list of all parties to the proceedings below. Nonetheless, the only remaining 
parties to this action are Appellee/Plaintiff (hereinafter "A-T Asphalt") and 
Appellant/Defendant (hereinafter "Kennedy Funding"), the parties on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102(3)0). On December 85 2009, this Court granted Appellant's Petition for 
interlocutory appeal. See Supreme Court file; see also Utah R. App. P. 5. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
FIRST ISSUE: Was the district court correct when it considered the uncontested 
facts of this case? Kennedy Funding did not dispute the facts in A-T Asphalt's cross 
motion for partial summary judgment other than raising a foundational challenge.1 Did 
the trial court properly rule on the foundational challenges in favor of A-T Asphalt, and 
were the trial court's conclusions drawn from those facts proper? This issue was properly 
preserved and argued before the trial court below. R. 640-643, 714-719, 980-983. This 
issue is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Services, Inc., v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 
970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998) ("Because a summary judgment challenge presents 
only legal issues, we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness. We 
1
 Kennedy Funding also raised a relevance challenge which it does not argue on appeal R. 
714 f 2. But see Kennedy Funding's Brief at 9, n. 1. The facts submitted by A-T Asphalt 
were material to the issue of "public improvement" and to the fact that Braffits Creek and 
Omnia Development were building a subdivision, a project, which included infrastructure 
such as the road at issue. 
1 
consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded 
that no disputed issues of material fact existed." (citations omitted)); Pianos v. Olsen and 
Assoc. Const., Inc., 2005 UT App. 446, 123 P.2d 816, \ 10 ("We review a summary 
judgment determination for correctness, granting no deference to the [district] court's 
legal conclusions. We determine only whether the [district] court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the [district] court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact." (quoting Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, \ 
15)). 
SECOND ISSUE: Was the district court correct when it concluded that work 
performed on a dedicated road, pursuant to a private contract with a subdivision 
developer and at the developer/owner's request, for the specific purpose of enhancing the 
abutting private property value and subdivision lots, was lienable work under Utah Code 
§38-1-1? This issue was preserved before the trial court and was the subject of the 
parties' motion and cross motion on appeal. See generally, R. 977. 
THIRD ISSUE: Was the district court correct when it concluded that pursuant to 
Utah Code §38-1-3, paving of dedicated roads pursuant to a private contract with the 
subdivision developer for the express purpose of enhancing the value of abutting lots 
owned by the subdivision developer was lienable against the abutting lots? This issue 
was preserved before the trial court and was the subject of the parties' motion and cross 
motion on appeal. See generally, R. 977. 
Because the Second and Third issues above are issues of statutory interpretation, a 
correctness standard applies. Trench Shoring Serv., Inc., v. Saratoga Springs Dev., LLC, 
2 
2002 UT App. 300, 57 P.3d 241, ^ 7. In that regard, it is well settled that, "[t]he plain 
language controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [should a 
court] ... look beyond the plain language." Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd. 2002 UT 
App 371 ^[11; 58 P.3d 873, 875 -876. Furthermore, "unambiguous language may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning," and a court should "avoid adding to or 
deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely necessary to make it a rational 
statute." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Nonetheless, "[w]hen uncertainty exists 
as to the interpretation and application of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its purpose 
in the light of its background and history, and also to the effect it will have in practical 
application." John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 
1990) (quoting Stanton Trans. Co., v. Davis, 341 P.2d207, 209 (Utah 1959)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 are the determinative 
statutes in this case. They are set out in full in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, A-T Asphalt seeks to foreclose its mechanic's lien against the lots in 
the 3200 Subdivision, Phase II. The mechanic's lien is for paving a road within the 
dedicated subdivision. Kennedy Funding loaned money secured by a blanket lien 
covering all the lots in 3200 Subdivision, Phase II, for the purpose of developing the 
subdivision. The trial court, on cross motions for summary judgment, ruled that the work 
performed by A-T Asphalt on the dedicated road was lienable against the 3200 
Subdivision, Phase II lots. Kennedy Funding is now pursuing this interlocutory appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kennedy Funding does not challenge the trial court's recitation of facts in its 
memorandum decision except for paragraphs 2 and 4 in A-T Asphalt's Statement of 
Additional Facts. See Kennedy Funding Brief at 24. Accordingly, A-T Asphalt recites 
the uncontroverted facts as set out in the trial court's memorandum decision. R. 978-983. 
A-T Asphalt will then address Kennedy Funding's challenges of paragraphs 2 and 4 in A-
T Asphalt's Statement of Additional Facts. 
Kennedy Funding's Statement of Facts generally R. 494 
1. The properties that are the subject of this dispute are located in Iron 
County, Utah, and are more particularly described as follows: All of lots 1 through 240 of 
3200 SUBDIVISION, PHASE 2, according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the 
Office of the Iron County Recorder. Parcel numbers: 0223-0002-0001 through D-0223-
0002-0240 ("3200 Phase 2"). 
2. In September 1985, the plat for 3200 Phase 2 was made, acknowledged, 
and recorded with the Iron County Recorder. A certified copy of this plat, with the 
corporate acknowledgment, corporate dedication of all streets and easements, county 
acceptance, and signature of the Iron County Attorney, is attached as Exhibit A to 
Kennedy Funding's Supporting Memorandum. 
3. At all relevant times, Defendant Braffits Creek Estates, LLC ("Braffits 
Creek"), was the owner of 3200 Phase 2. 
4. At all relevant times, Defendant Omnia Development, Inc. ("Omnia"), was 
the general contractor relating to work being performed on 3200 Phase 2. 
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5. In May 2007, Kennedy Funding loaned the amount of $28,860,000.00 to 
Braffits Creek. This loan was secured by a trust deed relating to certain real property, 
including 3200 Phase 2. The trust deed was recorded on May 31, 2007, with the Iron 
County Recorder as Entry no. 553726, Book 1090, beginning page 875. 
6. Plaintiff executed a Subcontract Agreement with Omnia dated August 15, 
2007, for "installation of 2.5" of hot mix asphalt on all roadways in the Project." As 
defined in the Subcontract Agreement, " 'Project' is Phase 2.1 of Braffits Mountain, 
legally described as 3200 Subdivision, Phase II, Iron County, Utah, lots 74 thru 83, 117 
thru 130, 142 thru 156, 161 thru 177, 187 thru 202, and 210 thru 216." 
7. Beginning in August 2007, Plaintiff paved a portion of road within 3200 
Phase 2, but was never compensated for this work. 
8. In December 2007, Plaintiff filed with the Iron County Recorder's Office a 
lien notice for the amount due of $652,114.40, as entry no. 00564739. This notice was 
filed to include all lots within 3200 Phase 2. 
A-T Asphalt's Statement of Additional Facts generally R. 640 
1. The original developer of 3200 Phase 2 dedicated the roads within the 
subdivision to Iron County when the subdivision plat was recorded in 1985. However, 
Iron County has never accepted the roads in 3200 Phase 2 for county maintenance 
because the roads were not built to county standards. Iron County consistently told 
Braffits Creek that the 3200 Phase 2 roads would not be accepted for county 
maintenance. 
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2. Prior to the improvements by Braffits Creek, the roads were unimproved 
roads accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck. 
3. The fact statement has apparently been withdrawn. (Kennedy Funding 
objected to it on hearsay grounds, and Plaintiff omitted it in its reply memorandum.). 
4. The pavement provided by Plaintiff was an essential part of the 
development plan of 3200 Phase 2. 3200 Phase 2 was planned as a high-end mountain 
community and Braffits Creek planned on selling the lots at a premium as they would be 
improved mountain lots with utilities. Without the pavement, there was no possibility of 
the development working financially. 
5. Because the 3200 Phase 2 subdivision plat had been accepted in 1985, none 
of the modern requirements for accepting a subdivision plat were imposed on the original 
developer. 
6. Iron County did not request or contract with any group, entity, or individual 
to make improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. 
7. The improvements of the 3200 Phase 2 roads were not done pursuant to the 
Procurement Code, Utah Code §63G-1-101 et seq., or any request or award of any 
contract by the County. 
8. Stephen R. Piatt, the Iron County engineer, did not know that Braffits 
Creek would actually cause the roads to be paved until he saw the road construction 
happening. 
9. Iron County issued no permits for improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. 
Iron County did not inspect the roads. 
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10. Iron County has not received a bond or any financial guarantee for the 3200 
Phase 2 roads. 
11. Although the 3200 Phase 2 roads were dedicated to Iron County in the 1985 
plat map, Iron County did not consider the road improvement from an ATV trail to a 
paved road with underground utilities an Iron County project, but instead viewed it as a 
private project to benefit 3200 Phase 2 and the owner of that subdivision. 
12. Some of the road that was paved by Plaintiff is not located on property 
dedicated in the 1985 plat as a public roadway, but was instead located in private 
property owned by Braffits Creek. The intent was to amend the plat after improvements 
were made. 
13. This fact statement is insufficiently supported to be considered. 
14. Based on the default of the property owner, Braffits Creek, and the 
developer, Omnia, on September 18, 2008, the Court entered judgment for the value of 
the work and reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $732,029.96. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 does not bar a mechanic's lien for work done on a 
dedicated road when the lien is not against the dedicated road itself but rather against the 
abutting lots that were benefitted by the pavement. Moreover, because the work 
performed here involved no public funds and was done pursuant to private contract with 
the subdivision developer, and because the plat must be amended, this was not a "public 
improvement" as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. Further, Utah law draws 
a distinction between work done on a subdivision and work done on a single residence. 
7 
Infrastructure work performed as part of a subdivision development is not off-site work 
and is thus lienable against lots in the subdivision benefitted thereby. This is entirely 
consistent with Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE 
UNCONTESTED FACTS OF THIS CASE. KENNEDY FUNDING DID NOT 
DISPUTE THE FACTS IN A-T ASPHALT'S CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OTHER THAN RAISING A FOUNDATIONAL 
CHALLENGE. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED ON THE 
FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGE IN FAVOR OF A-T ASPHALT, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT'S CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THOSE FACTS WERE PROPER. 
Kennedy Funding challenges the trial court's conclusions concerning paragraphs 2 
and 4 of A-T Asphalt's Statement of Facts. The trial court referenced these two facts in 
connection with its discussion of First of Denver Mort. Invest, v. C.N. Zundel and 
Assoc, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). R. 977, Memorandum Decision at 20. Kennedy 
Funding claims that the trial court improperly drew conclusions from these facts or 
otherwise improperly considered them. Kennedy Brief at 24-26. While a complete 
discussion of First of Denver will be made in Point III(B) below, a brief discussion of 
that case as it relates to the facts challenged by Kennedy Funding will be made here. As 
will be shown, the trial court properly considered the facts Kennedy Funding challenges. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Fact that Prior to Improvement by 
Braffits and Omnia, the Subject Road was Nothing More Than an ATV and 
Horse Trail. 
Paragraph 2 of A-T Asphalt's Statement of facts provides: "Prior to the 
improvement by Braffits Creek, the roads were unimproved roads accessible only by 
foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck." R. 641, f 2. This allegation of fact was 
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supported by the Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, the Iron County Engineer. R. 669, Ht 1-5. 
It was likewise supported by the Affidavit of Steven Barnhart. R. 674, f 14 and Exhibits 
A, B, C and D thereto. Importantly, this allegation of fact was not challenged by 
Kennedy Funding in its Memorandum in Opposition, other than to challenge the 
relevance of the allegation. R. 714, \ 2. 
Because the evidence was overwhelming that the roads at issue in this case were 
nothing more than an ATV or horse trail before Omnia Development began its work, see, 
e.g. R. 674 HI 14, 15 and R. 676-679, Kennedy Funding admitted that fact in its 
Memorandum in Opposition. R. 714, \ 2. Nonetheless, Kennedy takes issue with the 
phrasing used by the trial court in its memorandum, that "the roads paved by Plaintiff 
were, prior to such paving, 'accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive 
truck.5" R. 996 (emphasis added); see also Kennedy Funding brief at 25. Kennedy 
Funding alleges the trial court erred in this statement because it was undisputed that the 
condition of the roads as an ATV trail was changed when Omnia Development began its 
work in 2005, and that by the time Kennedy Funding recorded its Trust Deed in 2007, the 
roads were drivable as dirt roads. Thus, Kennedy Funding argues that A-T Asphalt's 
pavement of the roads was not an "improvement" of the abutting lots within the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 and First of Denver. Id. 
First, the trial court's phrasing was not inaccurate. "Prior to" A-T Asphalt's 
paving, the roads were in fact accessible only by foot, horse, ATV or four wheel drive. 
The trial court did not say "immediately prior to" as Kennedy Funding suggests. Simply 
because the trial court did not go into great detail regarding the cutting of the roads, 
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extensive engineering work, the utilities that were installed—water, power, the subgrade 
work and road base compaction, etc., that was done by Omnia Development before A-T 
Asphalt paved the roads, it does not mean the trial court was unaware of these facts or 
misconstrued them. 
Second, the testimony Kennedy Funding provided does not support its conclusion 
that the subject roads were accessible by something other than foot, horse, ATV or four 
wheel drive before A-T Asphalt paved the roads. True, most mountain subdivisions in 
southern Utah have dirt roads. Kennedy Funding brief at 24, citing Steve Barnhart's 
deposition. It does not follow, however, that the particular dirt roads in 3200 Phase II 
were so accessible. Kennedy Funding cites to pages 66 and 67 of Steven T. Shrope's 
deposition. R. 715, f 5. That testimony does not help Kennedy Funding either. Mr. 
Shrope testified that the 3200 Phase II roads had not been graveled. R. 739, lines 9-24. 
Aside from suggesting that the roads in 3200 Phase II "kind o f look like the roads in 
3200 Phase I, Steven Shrope's testimony is entirely unhelpful. Further, "kind o f is 
vague testimony at best. In any event, no testimony is offered by Mr. Shrope that the 
roads in Phase I are in fact accessible by something other than foot, horse, ATV or four 
wheel drive. Id. 
The testimony from Gary Goodsell is even less helpful. Kennedy Funding cites to 
pages 66 and 67 of Mr. Goodsell's deposition for support that the 3200 Phase II roads 
were drivable. Mr. Goodsell's testimony does not support that fact. 
Q. All right. Let's look at Exhibit 7, both photographs. Those roads 
don't show that they are finished, final road base even if you weren't going 
to pave it, final grade, compaction, road base on there -
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Mr. Strassberg: I'm going to object just to the extent that the photo is what 
it is, and comments regarding it are not evidence. 
A. Again, I honestly don't know. Again, I'm not that familiar with 
what would be required to - you know, if there is additional requirements 
beyond what was there to have that deemed a completed road. It looked 
like to me the roads were roughly in the same condition they were in Phase 
I, but that 'sjust my uneducated guess, (emphasis added). 
R. 742, 743. An uneducated guess is not evidence. The proffered testimony violates Mr. 
Strassberg's own objection. Finally, no testimony is offered that Phase I roads were 
accessible by means other than foot, horse, ATV or four wheel drive. Moreover this 
testimony is given while acknowledging that Mr. Goodsell spoke with Mr. James Fales, 
that the target market for the subdivision lots was Las Vegas, and that at least some lot 
sales were in the intended range of $700,000 to $800,000. R. 743. 
Kennedy Funding then cites to the testimony of Ronald Larson, one of the project 
engineers. Mr. Larson testified that he drove on the road in 2006 when it was not paved 
and then drove up to the subdivision again after it was paved. R. 746, lines 5-12. He 
was unclear in his memory what had been paved and what had not been paved when he 
drove on the road. Id.] see also R. 747, lines 6-12. No testimony was suggested about 
what he drove when he drove to the subdivision, however. The admitted statement of 
fact was that the subdivision roads were accessible by four wheel drive. R. 714, f^ 2. 
Absolutely no evidence was given that the engineer drove something other than a four 
wheel drive or ATV. This testimony is likewise unhelpful in Kennedy's effort to claim 
that A-T Asphalt's paving was not a necessary improvement to the subdivision road 
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because the roads were accessible by something other than an ATV, horse, or four wheel 
drive. 
Next, Kennedy Funding appeals to the testimony of Daren Cottam, a principal of 
A-T Asphalt. As did Ronald Larson, Daren Cottam drove on a road in 3200 Phase II 
Subdivision sometime in 2006. R. 751, lines 6-9. Again, no evidence is offered on what 
he drove or precisely where he drove. It is simply a casual, vague reference. Plus, he 
testified that "they were building the roads" in 2006, R. 750, line 6, and that although the 
roads had been cut, he could not recall whether he saw actual construction taking place 
on the roads at the time. R. 751, lines 3-5. This testimony is not helpful to Kennedy 
Funding's point. No testimony is offered about what Mr. Cottam drove or whether the 
roads were accessible by car. 
Kennedy Funding cites again to the testimony of Steve Shrope. Mr. Shrope 
testified that the roads were cut and "appeared" to be graded. R. 736, lines 20, 21. He 
was clear that heavy equipment was being moved on the road because he almost got hit 
by the equipment. R. 737, lines 18-23. Mr. Shrope was driving a jeep at the time. R. 
737, line 25. None of this evidence submitted by Kennedy Funding supports its position 
that the roads were accessible by something other than a four wheel drive truck or ATV 
during the time period in question. 
Notwithstanding, and more to the point, even if the roads were drivable as dirt 
roads and accessible by a car, it does not follow that they cannot be improved. It does 
not follow that A-T Asphalt's paving the road was not an "improvement" to the 
subdivision furthering the "comfortable and convenient" use of the lots and enhancing 
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their value. First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 525. Pavement of the roads to better access the 
project and hit that target market of $700,000 - $800,000 per lot2 by Mr. Fales was 
essential to the project and was an improvement to the subdivision lots. These road 
improvements and infrastructure improvements were part of the subdivision 
development. They were not off-site developments. As did the subcontractor and 
contractor in First of Denver, A-T Asphalt and Omnia Development improved the road 
and other infrastructure in 3200 Phase II subdivision, and ufumish[ed]... materials and 
labor . . . on the overall development site." Id. at 526. Specifically in First of Denver, 
this Court found that the subcontractor's work of installing sewer line in the subdivision 
road benefitted the entire subdivision and thus was lienable against the entire subdivision 
and was not an off-site improvement. Id. 
A-T Asphalt's pavement benefited at least 79 lots in the 3200 Phase II subdivision. 
Kennedy Funding's Statement of Fact, \ 6. Similar to the lender in First of Denver, 
Kennedy Funding's trust deed was a blanket trust deed over the entire 3200 Phase II 
subdivision. Kennedy Funding's Statement of Fact, f^ 5. A-T Asphalt's paving was an 
improvement to the infrastructure and is part of the subdivision itself. Thus, its lien is a 
proper lien against the subdivision lots. First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 526. We are not 
talking about improvement of individual lots or homes on individual lots in this case as 
Kennedy Funding's legal arguments suggest. We are talking about development of a 
subdivision. That is a significant distinction under Utah law. John Holmes Const, Inc., 
2
 The lots were multiple acres each. R. 504-507. 
13 
v. R.A. McKellExcavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, f 15, 131 P.3d 199; Western Mort. Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Const. Co., 424 P.2d437, 439 (Utah 1967). 
Kennedy Funding's distinction that it attempts to create over the trial court's 
casual reference that "prior to [A-T Asphalt's] paving," the roads were accessible only by 
foot, horse, ATV or four wheel drive, is a distinction without meaning in view of the law 
established in First of Denver. R. 996 Memorandum Decision. The trial court 
understood the law and properly construed paragraph 2 of A-T Asphalt's statement of 
facts. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Proper Foundation Existed for the 
Testimony that "Without the Pavement, There was no Possibility of the 
Development Working Financially." 
Kennedy Funding challenges paragraph 4 of A-T Asphalt's Statement of Fact, 
which provides in relevant part that "[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of 
the development working financially." See A-T Asphalt's Statement of Fact, \ 4 above; 
see also R. 996 and R. 996 n.12. Kennedy Funding argues that this statement is "the 
unfounded and conclusory opinion of one person [Steve Barnhart] regarding the 
development plans and financial expectations of another entity, Braffits Creek." 
Kennedy Funding's Brief at 25. Kennedy Funding made a similar challenge before the 
trial court. R. 980 n.3. The court below properly found that this statement was supported 
by sufficient foundation. 
Affidavits supporting facts on summary judgment "shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Utah 
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R. Civ. P. 56(e). The trial court "may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions." Id. In his affidavit, Steve Barnhart testified: "Paved roads were 
essential to the success of 3200 Phase II." R. 674, f 7. Mr. Barnhart's testimony was 
supplemented by his deposition, wherein he testified: "Pavement was essential to making 
the project work. It couldn't be a high-end project, getting the prices that Braffits wanted 
out of the lots without paving." R. 684, lines 11-14. An examination of Steven 
Barnhart's relationship and involvement with the development and developer is helpful in 
resolving this foundational issue. 
Steven Barnhart was the Omnia Development employee responsible "to organize 
the subcontractors, to do all the infrastructure for the project and to supervise the 
installation of that infrastructure." R. 682, page 6, lines 6-9; see also R. 674 f 2. Omnia 
Development was the managing contractor for site development and off-site 
developments of Braffits Creek or the 3200 Subdivision, Phase II. R. 682, page 5, lines 
21-23; R. 685, page 17, line 10 through page 18, line 11. Braffits Creek owned the 
subdivision and Omnia Development developed the subdivision. R. 682, page 5, lines 
21-23; R. 674, f 6. Omnia Development "was an affiliate company of Braffits Creek 
Estates, LLC." R. 674, ^ 6. James Fales was the "main person" of Omnia Development. 
R. 682, page 5, line 14. James Fales was also the manager of Braffits Creek. R. 517. 
Steve Barnhart worked directly with James Fales who was registered agent for both 
Omnia Development and Braffits Creek Estates, LLC. R. 683, page 9, lines 9-11; R. 682, 
page 5, line 14; R. 61,12; R. 62, f 6-11; R. 67; R.76. Even Kennedy Funding's counsel 
acknowledged at oral argument that Omnia Development and Braffits Creek Estates, 
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LLC "were basically one in the same." R. 1070, page 14, lines 16, 17. From August, 
2005, until November 2007, Steve Bamhart was at the project almost daily for 12 hours a 
day, except Sundays and bad weather days. R. 674,f4. Steve Bamhart "worked closely 
with the principals of Braffits Creek." R. 674, f 6. He "worked under James Fales . . . 
the main person on site to carry out what his requests were." R. 683, page 9, lines 9-11. 
All of the testimony in the record supports the conclusion that Steve Bamhart was closely 
involved with James Fales who was the main person for both Omnia Development and 
Braffits Creek, the contractor and property owner, respectively; that he worked directly 
under Mr. Fales, and that he worked on the site for just over two years and almost daily 
developing the project under direction of James Fales. It is thus reasonable to conclude 
that it was under direction from James Fales that Steve Bamhart laid out the whole 
project to A-T Asphalt, R. 684, page 15, lines 23, 24, and explained: 
[W]e wanted to pave - at the time we wanted to pave from the county road, 
from the [Sjummit exit all the way up - all the way up that county frontage 
road up this small section of road labeled on your Exhibit 12 as B, and then 
up the DWR road and then throughout the project itself. 
Pavement was essential to making the project work. It couldn't be a high-
end project, getting the prices that Braffits wanted out of the lots without 
paving. 
R. 684, page 16, lines 3-14 (emphasis supplied). 
Steve Bamhart was competent to testify that: "[T]he intention was to create an 
accessible road from the [Sjummit frontage road up a, what we call the DWR right-of-
way, and then put in - develop the road on into the subdivision and throughout the 
subdivision, put in a water system, put in electrical and gas and so forth." R. 682, page 8, 
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lines 3-8. The trial court recognized this. R. 980, n.3; R. 996, n.12. More than sufficient 
foundation exists for Mr. Barnhart's testimony that: "Without the pavement, there was no 
possibility of the development working financially." See A-T Asphalt's Statement of 
Fact, Tf 4. A-T Asphalt's Statement of Fact, ]f 4, is otherwise unchallenged and is 
properly before this court. 
The trial court properly understood and applied the facts in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
A-T Asphalt's Statement of Facts. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT WORK 
PERFORMED ON A DEDICATED ROAD PURSUANT TO A PRIVATE CONTRACT 
WITH A SUBDIVISION DEVELOPER AND AT THE DEVELOPER/OWNER'S 
REQUEST FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ENHANCING THE ABUTTING 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND SUBDIVISION LOTS WAS LIENABLE WORK UNDER 
UTAH CODE SECTION 38-1-1. 
In addressing this point, A-T Asphalt will divide its arguments into three areas. 
First, A-T Asphalt will discuss the meaninof "public improvement" as used in Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-1, in view of the language, purpose and history of the mechanic's lien and 
bonding statutes. Second, A-T Asphalt will address the plain language of the Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-1, applying principles of statutory construction, to the point that A-T Asphalt 
did not lien the dedicated road itself, and that Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 does not bar a lien 
against abutting lots that were improved by the road in the residential subdivision 
context. Finally, A-T Asphalt will address the fact that the paving went outside of the 
dedication and that the developer's intent was to amend the dedication to conform to the 
actual paving. Thus, the dedication was subject to later amendment of the plat and 
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location of the road and the paving was not a "public improvement" within the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
A. A-T Asphalt's Paving of the Dedicated Road Pursuant to Private Contract 
with the Subdivision Owner/Developer for the Purpose of Enhancing the 
Value and Marketability of the Developer's Lots was not a "Public 
Improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 provides: "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply 
to any public building, structure or improvement."3 What is a "public improvement" 
within the meaning of the statute? Kennedy Funding argues simply that "[t]he paving at 
issue was performed on a public road and therefore constitutes a 'public improvement' to 
which the Mechanic's Lien Statute 'shall not apply.'" Kennedy Funding Brief at 16. 
That is the beginning and end of Kennedy Funding's analysis. Kennedy Funding 
entirely fails to address the trial court's reasoning in answering this question. The answer 
to this question requires both statutory analysis as well as and an understanding of case 
law addressing the subject. 
Of absolute necessity, the answer to the question of "what is a public improvement 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1," involves interpretation of the statute. 
Nonetheless, Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 should not be read in isolation. The Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute should be read as a whole. In that regard, this Court recently said: 
When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary goal is 
to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. We do so by 
looking at the best evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language 
of the statute itself. As part of the well-worn cannon of statutory 
construction, we must read the plain language of the statute as a whole. 
Under this "whole statute" interpretation, we construe provisions in 
3
 A courtesy copy of this code section is attached in the addendum. 
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harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes 
under the same and related chapters. We do so because a statute is passed 
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general 
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed 
in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a 
harmonious whole, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Archuleta v. St. Mark's Hospital, 2009 UT 36, f^ 8. Nowhere is that statement more true 
than in the mechanic's lien and bonding statutes. The mechanic's lien statutes and the 
bonding statutes share a common purpose and have an undisputed interplay between 
them. Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 184 P.3d 610, 625, \ 49 (Utah App. 2008). 
Thus, this commonality among these statutes and their purpose should be considered 
when interpreting Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
In view of the overall statutory scheme for construction work and the remedies 
available to subcontractors when the general contractor fails to pay, was A-T Asphalt's 
pavement of the roads in the 3200 Phase II subdivision, pursuant to private contract with 
the owner/developer, a "public improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-1? Generally speaking, a "public improvement" "does not include private affairs 
or commercial enterprises." 13 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 
§37.01 (3rd ed. 1997). See also Comstock & Davis, Inc. v. City of Eden Prairie, 557 
N.W. 2d 213, 216 (MN.App. 1997). Public improvements can be legally provided for 
only by the officers, boards or departments duly empowered." 13 Eugene McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations, §37.08 (3rd ed. 1997). It is not enough merely that 
the improvement is on public property. The governmental entity having authority over 
the public property must be involved in its improvement. Public funds must be involved. 
19 
Again, generally speaking, "[u]nder most charters improvements cannot be ordered nor 
the contract entered into without formal action, either by ordinance or resolution, adopted 
by the legislative body." Id. §37.71; see also Id. §37.78. 
Moreover, because the government entity is securing the work and has posted a 
bond, no lien is available against the public improvement itself. The contractor's remedy 
is against the bond held by the governmental entity. McQuillin explains it this way: 
The intention has been, as frequently expressed injudicial decisions, to 
assimilate so far as practicable, the regulations as to liens in respect to 
private real estate and liens in respect to improvements upon municipal 
contracts. One difference which necessarily exists is as to the subject 
matter to which a lien applies. In the case of private real property the lien 
applies directly to the property improved. But in the case of a public 
improvement, since it would be intolerable that public property should be 
encumbered with liens in favor of contractors and others, it is provided that 
the lien shall attach to the moneys in the hands of the municipality set apart 
or appropriated for the payment of the sums to become due upon the 
contract for the improvement. . . . In short, in the case of a public 
improvement the money to become due from the municipality under the 
contract for the improvement is substituted for and stands in the place of 
the real property affected by the improvement. 
Id. §37.185 (emphasis added). 
Utah follows these principles. If a county, such as Iron County in this case, 
utilizes public funds for a public improvement, it is required to post a bond. The 
subcontractor's remedy is then against the bond, not the public improvement. Utah Code 
Ann. §14-1-18(2) and Utah Code Ann. §63G-6-505(4).4 Utah's bonding statute 
specifically applies to "all contracts for the construction, alteration or repair of any public 
building or public work of the state or a political subdivision of the state." Utah Code 
4
 And of course, Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
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Ann. §14-1-18(2). By definition, however, a political subdivision means a county or 
other entity "which expends public funds for construction." Utah Code Ann. §14-1-
18(1). Any money spent by the County would be public funds. Yet, Iron County spent 
no funds whatsoever on this project—not a dime. Moreover, "Iron County did not 
request or contract with any group, entity or individual to make improvements to the 
3200 Phase 2 roads." A-T Asphalt undisputed Statement of Fact, J^ 6. The road 
improvements within 3200 Subdivision Phase II were not done pursuant to the 
procurement code. A-T Asphalt undisputed Statement of Fact, ^ 7. The Iron County 
engineer did not even know the roads were actually going to be paved until he saw the 
roads being paved. Id. \ 8. Iron County issued no permits for the 3200 Subdivision 
Phase II roads and did not inspect the roads. Id. f^ 9. No bond or other financial 
guarantee was in fact posted for Iron County to which A-T Asphalt's lien or claim could 
attach. Id. f 10. Iron County considered this project and the road improvement "a 
private project to benefit 3200 Phase 2 and the owner of that subdivision." Id. \ 11. Even 
Kennedy Funding acknowledged that when it argued that A-T Asphalt's remedy was 
pursuit of a "private" bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §14-2-1 et seq. R. 500. The fact 
that no public bond was required in this case certainly weighs in on the policy behind 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 and the determination of whether a private contract for the 
benefit of a privately owned subdivision was a "public improvement." It cannot be said 
that this was a "public improvement" when the public had absolutely nothing to do with 
this project, aside from the bare fact that the road was dedicated to the county twenty 
years earlier. And when the road was dedicated twenty years earlier, it was nothing more 
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than a horse and ATV trail until Braffits Creek began its improvements. Furthermore, 
the dedication must be amended because the road was cut outside the dedication in the 
plat. A-T Asphalt Statement of Fact, ^ 12.5 Barring a lien for work performed on this 
road was never the intent of the legislature, particularly where, as will be discussed 
below, the road itself was not liened. 
The bonding statutes and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 must be read in harmony with 
each other. Utah courts have consistently done that. Utah Courts have recognized that 
because mechanic's liens do not apply to a public improvement, the contractor must look 
to the "public" bonding statute. 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law is to preclude landowners from 
having their lands improved by others without becoming personally 
responsible for the reasonable value of materials and labor. The purpose of 
the mechanics' lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection 
to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or labor. However, subcontractors 
and suppliers are precluded under the mechanic's lien statute from placing a 
lien on "any public building, structure or improvement." Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-1 (1974). Therefore, suppliers and subcontractors have principally 
looked for protection to the second device, namely that of the payment 
5
 Kennedy Funding claims this statement of fact lacks foundation. R. 717, 718. First, 
Steve Barnhart testified that the plat was to be amended because the roads did not follow 
the recorded plat. R. 675, ^ f 16. As demonstrated in Point 1(B) above, Steve Barnhart's 
association with Omnia Development, the contractor, Braffits Creek Estates, the property 
owner, and James Fales, the main person in both those entities, which association lasted 
more than two years as the subdivision infrastructure was being installed and was almost 
daily, and further the fact that Steve Barnhart was in charge of putting in all the 
infrastructure during that time including the road with portions outside the dedication, 
provides more than sufficient foundation for the statement that "[t]he intent was to amend 
the plat after the improvements were made." A-T Asphalt Statement of Fact, f 12. 
Further, the fact that the road was cut and paved outside the plat designation was attested 
to by Steve Woolsey, the surveyor, who located the center of the road and the lot comers. 
R. 688. The trial court was correct that there was adequate foundation for this testimony. 
R. 982 n.4. 
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bond, when providing labor or supplies for construction projects 
contracted for by governmental entities, (some internal quotation marks 
omitted, some citations omitted, italics added). 
Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Const, 754 P.2d 672, 673, 674 (Utah App. 1988). 
A public improvement is an improvement performed by agreement with a government 
agency or political subdivision. See Western Coating, Inc., v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 
P.2d 503, 504 (Utah 1990) ("We have reasoned that since mechanic's lien protection is 
not available in public contracts, 'performance bonds are required on public projects to 
provide substitute protection for laborers and material providers.'")(quoting CECO v. 
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989)). A public improvement 
applies only to the public property itself and does not include improvement to private 
property. See Geneva Pipe Co., v. S&HInsurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
1986)("Inasmuch as the materialman is precluded under Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 from 
placing a lien on public property,... the defense which may be asserted under section 
58A-1-19 does not apply to a claim of a materialman furnishing materials or labor to a 
bonded public construction project.") (emphasis added). 
To rule that an improvement is a "public improvement" merely because it is done 
on public property is simplistic and entirely ignores the purpose and intent of the 
mechanic's lien statute as cited in Cox Rock Products above. Here the subcontractor 
performed infrastructure work on a private subdivision for the benefit of the entire 
subdivision. See First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 526. Although the plat was recorded in 
1985, the intent was to amend the plat because the road as laid out did not follow the 
dedication. A-T Asphalt Statement of Fact, f^ 12. For all practical purposes, the road 
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here was not a dedicated road and in any event, the improvements were not done by 
agreement with the county. No public funds were expended whatsoever. Iron County 
did not supervise that work. This was not a public enterprise but a private one. Under 
these conditions, the improvement cannot be said to be "public" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 does not bar application 
of A-T Asphalt's mechanic's lien on the lots that abut the road or the lots that were 
otherwise improved and their value enhanced by completion of the subdivision 
infrastructure, including the paved roads. 
B. Even if Pavement of a Dedicated Road at the Request of the Subdivision 
Owner/Developer is a "Public Improvement" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-1, Work Performed in Connection with the Public 
Improvement is Lienable Against Abutting Lots Owned by the Subdivision 
Owner/Developer which were Enhanced in Both Value and Marketability. 
It is well established in Utah that "[t]he plain language controls the interpretation 
of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [should a court] ... look beyond the plain 
language." Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd. 2002 UT App 371 t l 1; 58 P.3d 873, 875-
876; see also Smith v. Utah Labor Comm n., 2009 UT 19,17; Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^  
7. Furthermore, a court should "avoid adding to or deleting from statutory language, 
unless absolutely necessary to make it a rational statute." Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). A statute should not be read in such as way that requires "additions to and 
subtractions from the statute's plain language." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, f 53. Nowhere are these 
principles more applicable than in this case. 
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It is an interesting question in this case whether Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 bars any 
work done in connection with a public improvement or whether it simply states that 
mechanic's liens are barred against the "public improvement" itself. Kennedy Funding 
asks this Court to read Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 to bar any work done whatsoever if it 
involves a "public improvement." Kennedy Funding Brief at 14-18. Leaving the 
question aside of whether the work here was a "public improvement," see Point 11(A), let 
us examine the plain language of the statute without adding statutory language. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 states that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not 
apply to any public building, structure or improvement." The plain reading of the statute, 
without adding to it, is that the mechanic's lien statutes do not apply to the public 
improvement, itself. The statute does not say, for example, "[t]he provisions of this 
chapter shall not apply to any public building, structure or improvement [project]." The 
statute does not say: "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to [work benefitting 
private property if it is done in connection with] any public building, structure or 
improvement." The statute does not say: "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply 
to any [work contracted by private entities in connection with a private enterprise if it in 
any way affects or involves a] public building, structure or improvement." To the 
contrary, the statute is simple. Utah's mechanic's lien law does not apply to the "public 
improvement" itself. Nothing is said about any other work or benefit particularly where, 
as in this case, the work was requested by a subdivision developer in connection with 
doing infrastructure for the subdivision and development of the lots. 
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If there is ambiguity in Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1, then this court should resolve 
that ambiguity by looking at the purpose of the mechanic's lien statute. John Wagner 
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 1990). "The purpose and 
intent of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act 'manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those 
who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a 
building or other improvement.'" Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, \ 8 (quoting John Wagner 
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 1990)). The intent of the 
mechanic's lien statutes is to prevent land owners, such as Braffits Creek, and in this 
case, Kennedy Funding, from having an absolute windfall by A-T Asphalt's paving of the 
subdivision roads, putting in $652,000 worth of value and work into the subdivision 
infrastructure, without paying for it. See e.g., Cox Rock Products, 754 P.2d at 673, 674. 
A-T Asphalt did not lien the road itself. A-T Asphalt's lien was against the subdivision 
lots. Kennedy Funding Statement of Fact, \ 8. The lots are privately held and are not a 
"public improvement." 
With the foregoing background and purpose in mind, any doubt about the wording 
of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1 should be construed in favor of A-T Asphalt. Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-1 should not be read to bar A-T Asphalt's lien against the subdivision lots 
that were benefitted and enhanced by the paved road. 
C. Because A-T Asphalt Paved Outside the Dedication Shown on the Plat, and 
Because the Plat was to be Amended to Realign Lots and Change the Road's 
Path, A-T Asphalt's Work was not a "Public Improvement" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
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Kennedy Funding's claim that because the road was dedicated, paving of the road 
was a "public improvement" is tenuous. It is undisputed that the road was paved in parts 
outside the dedication in the plat. This was a work in progress. The dedication of the 
road will be amended when the plat is amended. Consequently, Kennedy Funding's 
reasoning that the road is dedicated and is thus a public improvement is tenuous and 
based upon a temporary condition only. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE SECTION 38-1-3, THE PAVING OF DEDICATED 
ROADS PURSUANT TO A PRIVATE CONTRACT WITH THE SUBDIVISION 
DEVELOPER FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ENHANCING THE VALUE OF 
ABUTTING LOTS WAS LIENABLE AGAINST THE ABUTTING LOTS. 
A. The Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3, as Amended, Grants 
Subcontractors Like A-T Asphalt Performing Any Services or Furnishing Any 
Materials Used in "Any . . . Improvement to Any Premises in Any Manner" a 
Lien "Upon the Property Upon or Concerning Which They Have Rendered 
Service, or Performed Labor, or Furnished . . . Materials or Equipment." 
Thus, the ruling of Stanton Trans, Co., v. Davis does not apply. 
Resolution of this Third Issue necessarily involves an interpretation of the current 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3. In that regard, it is well settled that, "[t]he plain language 
controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [should a court] ... 
look beyond the plain language." Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd. 2002 UTApp 371 
f 11; 58 P.3d 873, 875 -876. Nonetheless, "[w]hen uncertainty exists as to the 
interpretation and application of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its purpose in the 
light of its background and history, and also to the effect it will have in practical 
application." John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 
1990) (quoting Stanton Trans. Co., v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1959). Finally, 
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"[t]he evolution of a statute through amendment by the Legislature may also shed light on 
a statute's intended meaning." Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ]f 23. 
As stated by this Court, "[t]he purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect those 
whose labor or materials have enhanced the value of property." A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, % 94 P.3d 270 (emphasis added). As early as 
1917, speaking of the purpose of mechanic's liens, this Court said: 
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien law manifestly has been to 
protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the 
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement. The result has been that the owner of the premises, at whose 
instance and for whose benefit the improvement is made, has been the one 
most likely to suffer loss. He pays at his peril the original contractor, who 
generally needs it and demands it as the work progresses. If he does not 
reserve enough of the fund in his own hands to pay for the labor of 
subcontractors and employees, and the price of materials, he incurs the risk 
of having to pay over again for at least a part of these items. The original 
contractor, as in this case, often defaults, with his compensation overdrawn 
and with subcontractors, employees, and materialmen unpaid. The owner 
of the premises suffers in consequence because his property is pledged for 
the payment of these obligations. 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 244 (1917). 
With these principles in mind, a careful examination of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 
and the cases of Zions First Nat. Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387 (Utah 1970) and Stanton 
Trans. Co., v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959) is in order. 
Section 38-1-3, entitled "Those entitled to lien - What may be attached," reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and 
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artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise . . . . This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner may 
have in the property. 
It may be instructive, for purposes of this matter, to view the section as quoted 
above consisting of several parts, including the following: (1) Starting at the beginning of 
the section, and continuing through "or bestowed labor," the first part lists those classes 
of persons who can claim a lien and what benefit they must have provided in order for a 
lien to arise; (2) starting at "shall have a lien," the second part describes the lien and what 
property it shall arise upon; (3) starting at "for the value of," the third part describes the 
amount of the lien; (4) starting at "whether at the instance," the fourth part describes by 
whom the benefit must have been requested; and (5) the final sentence limits the lien to 
the interest of the owner in the property. 
In the case at hand, only the interpretations of the first and second parts of this 
section are truly at issue. The issue of whether the Zions case and the Stanton case apply 
to this matter as argued by Kennedy Funding, is relevant to resolving the interpretation of 
the first and second parts of §38-1-3—who may claim a lien, what benefit they must 
provide so that a lien arises, and upon which property the lien arises. 
In Zions First Nat Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387 (Utah 1970), this Court 
considered whether an architect's work for a lessee was lienable against the lessor. 
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While the Court held that the work was not lienable for reasons not relevant to this case, 
the Court also examined whether an architect's work was lienable in general. Id. at 401. 
The Court noted that: 
From the history and purpose of the statute it appears that the words "upon 
or concerning which" were simply intended to be generally descriptive of 
the manner of which certain work and services are performed. For 
example, work done by contractors or laborers upon an oil well or building 
is done upon the property, whereas, the services of architects and engineers 
is work which may be regarded as done "with respect to" or "concerning" 
the property. 
Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added) (quoting Stanton, 341 P.2d at 210). Kennedy Funding 
argues that this case, with Stanton which the Court was citing in the above quote, means 
that the phrase "or concerning which" in §38-1-3 applies only to architects and engineers, 
and not to a contractor paving the streets of a subdivision like A-T Asphalt. Kennedy 
Funding's Brief at 20. Because the Zions case relies directly on Stanton, the latter case is 
addressed in more detail below. However, the Court in Zions clearly did not hold that the 
"or concerning which" language only applied to architects and engineers. This can be 
discovered by noting the phrase "for example," emphasized in the above quote. 446 P.2d 
at 388. Furthermore, even if the holding of the Zions case is taken as suggested by 
Kennedy Funding—that the "concerning which" phrase is applicable to the architect 
seeking to claim a mechanics' lien—such a holding is necessarily narrow, applying only 
to liens claimed by architects, and not dispositive of whether the same language would 
apply to liens claimed by other classes of claimants under §38-1-3. The district court in 
this case also recognized and acknowledged this fact. Memorandum Decision at 13. 
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In Stanton, the plaintiff sued to foreclose a mechanics' lien consisting of two 
claims, one for transporting a drilling rig to a well site, and one for labor to erect the 
drilling rig at the well site. 341 P.2d at 208. The trial court rejected the lien as to the 
claim for transporting the drilling rig to the site, but held the lien to be valid as to the 
labor for erecting the rig on site. Id. 
As pointed out by Kennedy Funding in its Brief at 20-21, this Court in Stanton 
carefully considered the legislature's previous amendments to what is now §38-1-3. The 
Court noted that mechanics' liens had been provided for in four separate sections prior to 
1933, and that the section that had before specifically addressed the rights of architects, 
engineers, and artisans had by the time of Stanton been consolidated with other sections, 
and the phrase "or concerning which" was added to the relevant statute. 341 P.2d at 210. 
Just as it did in reference to the Zions case, Kennedy Funding attempts to argue 
that the addition of the phrase "or concerning which" to the mechanics' lien statute in 
§38-1-3 was intended by the legislature only for the benefit of "certain artisans who work 
directly on the improvement, though the manner in which they perform that work is off-
site." Kennedy Funding Brief at p. 21. However, the Stanton case itself dispels this 
argument. The Court stated, 
We do not suggest that the clause, "shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which . . ." is not meant to apply to other classes of liens 
provided for in the statute. . . . From the history and purpose of the statute it 
appears that the words 'upon or concerning which' were simply intended to 
be generally descriptive of the manner in which certain work and services are 
performed. For example, work done by contractors or laborers upon an oil 
well or building is done upon the property, whereas, the services of architects 
and engineers is work which may be regarded as done "with respect to" or 
"concerning" the property. 
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341 P.2d at 210 (emphasis added). The key language emphasized above amply 
demonstrates that, just as in the later Zions case, the Court's use of architects and 
engineers as an "example" of those classes of laborers entitled to a lien for work "upon or 
concerning" the property, was intended to be an example and not as excluding other 
classes of laborers which might otherwise benefit from the addition of the "or concerning 
which" phrase. Id. 
Further demonstrating that Kennedy Funding's reliance on Stanton is flawed, the 
district court in the current case noted very carefully in its Memorandum Decision at 15, 
that this Court decided the Stanton case under a previous version of §38-1-3, which 
version the Stanton Court pointed out included "specific language requiring the work or 
materials to be upon the property," and that this language "would be idle verbiage" if the 
phrase "or concerning which" was controlling as to contractors and laborers. 341 P.2d at 
210. The specific language requiring work or materials to be upon the property stated 
that the lien given to contractors and laborers required "performing labor upon, or 
furnishing materials to be used in . . . or repair . . . building . . . or improvement upon 
land." Id. (emphasis added). 
In contrast, as the district court correctly pointed out, the current version of §38-1-
3 that is applicable to this matter omits the word "upon" where noted by emphasis above, 
and adds the word "to," so that the the statute now reads that the lien only requires 
"performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
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any premises in any manner." §38-1-3 (emphasis added). The amendment of the statute 
by the legislature to remove the word "upon" completely, as rightly observed by the 
district court, "appears to reflect an intent to remove" the requirement that work or 
materials be provided upon the property. Memorandum Decision at 15-16. See also 
Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 295 ^  23 
Neither the Zions case nor the Stanton case, therefore, stand for the proposition 
that the broader language "or concerning which" applies only to architects, engineers and 
artisans; neither do they represent any current requirement that work or materials must be 
provided by a contractor or laborer upon the actual land to be liened. Rather, what 
Stanton does establish and still represents is that lien rights are only established when the 
benefit to the property to be liened is not too remote or unforeseeable for the property 
owner. See also Western Mortgage, 424 P.2d at 439. As pointed out by the Stanton 
Court, the portion of the lien claim which was rejected by the trial court was for "several 
multiples" of the cost of drilling itself, 341 P.2d at 211, and was outside the owner's 
expectation of "peripheral work." Id. at 210. As this Court further stated in Stanton: 
In order to impose upon [the property owner] such additional burdens 
[beyond what he contracted to bear] the law must clearly spell out the 
responsibility. Otherwise, the entering into a contract for the improvement 
of one's property might open the door to unforeseeable risks for the 
property owner. He is aware of the amount of work to be done upon his 
property and fairly may be charged with knowledge of the extent thereof. 
But that is not true of peripheral work that may be in some remote way 
related to the contractor's activities. 
341P.2dat210. 
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Neither the Zions case nor Stanton case, to the extent that they are limited as 
demonstrated above, prevent A-T Asphalt from claiming its lien rights for paving in the 
3200 Subdivision. On the contrary, A-T Asphalt's work paving the roadways satisfies 
the relevant "foreseeability" principle of Stanton, because the owner of the 3200 
Subdivision is the party that requested the paving work, and the paving work was open 
and apparent to the owner of the property, thus eliminating any concerns about 
unforseeability of lien rights arising for the benefit of A-T Asphalt. See, e.g., Kennedy 
Funding's Brief at 24 ("[I]t was undisputed by both parties that the roads had been 
excavated and graded prior to [the time of the paving in 2007]."); see also Mem. in Supp. 
Of Plaintiff s Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in Opp. to Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. 
for Sum. Judg., p. 5 (R.641), and id., Exhibit 3, ffi[ 12-15 (R.674-75). A-T Asphalt's road 
pavement was not off-site work. First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 526. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the disproportionate amounts of the equipment transportation costs versus on-
site work in Stanton, A-T Asphalt's lien is for $652,114.40 in paving work compared to 
$28,860,000 in loans obtained by the owner to finance development. Kennedy Funding's 
Statement of Facts, ^ 5, 8. The district court in this case both agreed that foreseeability 
was a factor in the Court's decision in Stanton, and that any concern about 
unforseeability is absent from A-T Asphalt's lien claim. Memorandum Decision at 13-
14. 
The construction and proper interpretation of the current §38-1-3 was considered 
by the Court in the case of Graco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc., v. Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988). In that case, the Court considered a 
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defendant's argument that a mechanics' lien should not have arisen for equipment rental _ 
charges at an oil and gas exploration site, because "the Legislature failed to add language 
referring to rental material and equipment to the phrase in [§38-1-3 of the] statute 
specifically dealing with 'persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any . . . oil or gas well.'" Id. at 
1076-77. Besides pointing out that expanding the scope of the mechanics' lien statutes to 
address rental charges was an implicit purpose of the 1981 amendment to §38-1-3, this 
Court also stated: 
That reading of the statute not only ignores the implicit purpose of the 1981 
amendment, but also overlooks the most logical reading of the plain 
language of the statute. The phrase dealing with oil and gas wells is not, by 
itself, a complete sentence and must be read in connection with the 
remaining language of the sentence [being the first sentence of §38-1-3]. 
766 P.2d at 1077. In holding that the "most logical reading of the plain language of the 
statute" was to read a particular phrase in the first sentence of the statute "in connection 
with the remaining language of the sentence," Id., the Court provided the blueprint for the 
reading of §38-1-3 in this case. 
More specifically, applying the Court's holding to the case at hand requires the 
phrase "upon or concerning which" to be read in conjunction with the remainder of the 
sentence in which it is located. See 766 P.2d at 1077. The reading of §38-1-3 in this 
manner leads to the necessary conclusion that the expansive effect of "or concerning 
which" cannot be limited to architects and engineers, as argued by Kennedy Funding. 
Rather, "or concerning which" in the current version of §38-1-3 must be interpreted as 
being applicable to any other person of a class identified in the first sentence of that 
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section. Thus, any proposition to the contrary which otherwise might have been argued 
under Zions and Stanton was effectively overruled by the Court's instruction in Graco 
Fishing with respect to the proper method of reading §38-1-3. 
B. In First of Denver Mort. Invest, v. C.N. Zundel and Assoc, This Court Ruled 
that Infrastructure Work was Lienable and was not Off Site When 
Considering That the Entire Subdivision was Improved. 
In addition to the arguments made by Kennedy Funding and addressed above with 
respect to the first and second "parts" of §38-1-3, Kennedy Funding also attempts to 
create an issue with respect to what has been identified above as the fifth "part" of §38-1-
3, "[t]his lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property." 
Utah has long recognized this principle as stated in Eccles Lunber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 
241, 87 P. 713 (Utah 1906): "[A] mechanic's lien attaches to the land, and, unless the 
person against whom the claim for a mechanic's lien is made has some interest or estate 
in the land upon which the improvement is made, no lien attaches to the improvement as 
such." Id. at 715. 
Kennedy Funding argues that because A-T Asphalt improved the road, which was 
owned by the county, A-T Asphalt could not lien the subdivision lots that were owned by 
the developer. However, this argument fails to recognize that the paving of a road or 
doing other infrastructure work in a subdivision is an "improvement" to the entire 
subdivision, including lots within the subdivision which abut the roadway to which 
improvements are made. Kennedy Funding's argument misapprehends the nature of the 
improvements as being made to individual residential lots, where the improvement is 
actually to the subdivision as a whole. This Court has previously recognized the 
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distinction between improvements to an individual parcel and improvements to an entire 
subdivision. E.g., John Holmes Construction, 2005 UT 83 (holding that "work 
performed on a residential subdivision that involves installation of utilities, roadways, 
sewer lines, and irrigation systems does not constitute a project or improvement for a 
residence" requiring satisfaction of notice requirements related to residential liens, id. at 
ffl[ 15, 17); see also Western Mortgage, 424 P.2d at 439 ("The problem is one of notice. 
The presence of materials on the building site or evidence on the ground that work has 
commenced on a structure or preparatory thereto is notice to all the world that liens may 
have attached. However, the off-site construction in developing the subdivision for 
building sites would not necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that someone is 
claiming a lien on a particular lot in the subdivision. This is especially true as in this 
case, where the lender advanced money to build a home long after the subdivision had 
been laid out and developed. It is apparent that the persons who supplied labor or 
materials for the construction of roads, sewers, etc., could have filed liens for unpaid 
balances due them, if any. The erection of the home was separate and severable from the 
earlier work in developing the subdivision.")(emphasis added). 
In like manner, the paving completed by A-T Asphalt cannot properly be 
classified as an off-site improvement, as implied by Kennedy Funding's Brief at 21-22. 
Kennedy Funding's own financing extended to the developer was intended for 
improvement of the 3200 Subdivision, which most certainly included infrastructure in the 
roads. R. 516; R. 527; R. 674, fflf 12-15; R. 683 page 9, line 14 through page 10, line 6; 
Kennedy Funding's Statement of Fact, fflj 5 and 6; and compare First of Denver, 600 
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P.2d at 526 ("The mortgage loan in question was a blanket mortgage covering the entire 
subdivision. Because the initial work was performed over substantial portions of the 
property involved, it could not properly be characterized as being 'off-site5 as were the 
improvements in Western Mortgage in relation to the property that was the subject of the 
construction loan."). 
Kennedy Funding is not incorrect when it states that A-T Asphalt has relied on 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), 
extensively to support its arguments for summary judgment in its behalf. Kennedy 
Funding's Brief at 22. In fact, First of Denver and the cases related to it are on point with 
the issues before the Court in this case, and A-T Asphalt's reliance on these cases is not 
misplaced. The district court agreed when it uconclude[d] that allowing [A-T Asphalt]'s 
lien here is proper. The improvement on which the lien is based not only directly 
impacted the value of the liened property, but, for the anticipated scale of development on 
the property, it was also 'essential to the comfortable and convenient use of [the 
property].'" Memorandum Decision at 20 (quoting First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 525). 
The facts of the First of Denver case are in many key respects similar to the case 
at hand. The broad question there, as here, was whether, on property being improved as a 
subdivision, mechanics' lien rights arose early enough to have priority over a trust deed, 
the beneficiary of which was a lender extending funds for construction and development. 
600 P.2d at 523; see also John Holmes Const, Inc., v. R.A. McKell Excav., Inc., 2005 UT 
83, }^15, 131 P.3d 199, 202 (summarizing the main issue in the First of Denver case). 
The improvements that were made "consisted of locating existing lines and putting in 
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pipeline, water and sewer systems, and storm drains." 600 P.2d at 523. As part of its 
larger inquiry, the Court in First of Denver considered "whether [these improvements] 
met the general statutory requirements under Utah law for the attachment of mechanics' 
liens." Id. at 524. The Court began by examining the provisions of §38-1-3, id., just as 
has been done supra. 
The version of §38-1-3 which was considered by the Court in First of Denver was 
substantially similar in all key respects to the current version of the statute. The Court 
cited the relevant portion of the statute as follows: "Contractors, subcontractors and all 
persons performing any services or furnishing any materials used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in 
any manner" 600 P.2d at 524 (emphasis added) (quoting §38-1-3 (1953), as amended 
prior to Aug. 24, 1979). 
The Court then proceeded first by citing the general purpose of lien statutes. 600 
P.2d at 524-25 (quoting Stanton, 341 P.2d at 209 ("The purpose of the lien statutes is to 
protect those who have added directly to the value of property by performing labor or 
furnishing materials upon it.5')). The Court held that with this purpose in mind, "the 
broad language [of §38-1-3], 'improvement to any premises in any manner,' encompasses 
the instant case where sewer and water systems were installed on the subject property." 
Id. at 525 (emphasis added) (quoting §38-1-3). 
The Court went on to reason: 
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the material 
or labor be furnished solely on a building structure or that the work be 
performed solely on the lot on which a building is being erected. We agree 
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with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J. R. Christ 
Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs., 47 NJ. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), that 
a contractor should not be barred from enjoying the benefits of the 
mechanics' lien statute where his work not only enhances the value of the 
developer's land, but is also necessary to make residences to be built on 
such property habitable. The New Jersey Court cited Ladue Contracting 
Co. v. Land Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578 (Mo.App.1960), in 
emphasizing the fact that water and sewer systems are essential to the 
comfortable and convenient use of dwellings and that it would be "turnfing] 
the clock back to another century" to hold that such improvements are 
outside the terms of the lien statute. (Id. at 585.) 
600 P.2d at 525 (citations in original). On the basis of this and other reasoning in the 
case, the First of Denver Court held that priority for the mechanics' liens in the 
subdivision arose at the time work commenced on the subdivision-wide sewer and related 
improvements, and that said mechanics' liens had priority over the lender's competing 
claim. Id. 
As did the contractors in First of Denver, A-T Asphalt and Omnia Development 
improved the road and other infrastructure in 3200 Phase II subdivision, and "furnish[ed] 
. . . materials and labor . . . on the overall development site." Id. at 526. Specifically in 
First of Denver, this Court found that the subcontractor's work of installing sewer line in 
the subdivision road benefitted the entire subdivision and thus was lienable against the 
entire subdivision and was not an off-site improvement. 
In this case, the initial work performed by [contractor] related to and 
benefitted the entire subdivision. The mortgage loan in question was a 
blanket mortgage covering the entire subdivision. Because the initial work 
was performed over substantial portions of the property involved, it could 
not properly be characterized as being "off-site" as were the improvements 
in Western Mortgage in relation to the property that was the subject of the 
construction loan. (Italics added). 
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Id. (distinguishing Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967)). 
A-T Asphalt's paving benefited at least 79 lots in the 3200 Phase II subdivision. 
Kennedy Funding's Statement of Fact, % 6. Similar to the lender in First of Denver, 
Kennedy Funding's trust deed was a blanket trust deed over the entire 3200 Phase II 
subdivision. Kennedy Funding's Statement of Fact, f 5. A-T Asphalt's paving was an 
improvement to the infrastructure and is part of the subdivision itself. Thus, its lien is a 
proper lien against the subdivision lots. First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 526. A-T Asphalt's 
work was not the improvement of individual lots or homes on individual lots in this case, 
as Kennedy Funding's legal arguments suggest. We are talking about development of a 
subdivision. That is a significant distinction under Utah law. John Holmes Const., Inc., 
v. R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, \ 15, 131 P.3d 199; Western Mortgage, 424 
P.2dat439. 
Kennedy Funding is critical of the district court's reliance on the fact that "the 
roads paved by [A-T Asphalt] were, prior to such paving, 'accessible only by foot, on 
horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck.'" Memorandum Decision at 20 (R.996) (quoting 
A-T Asphalt's Statement of Add'1. Facts \ 2). Even assuming the roads may have been 
drivable after they were cut in and graded, does not preclude A-T Asphalt's paving from 
being "necessary to make the residences to be built on such property habitable." 600 
P.2d at 526. As noted previously, the First of Denver court stated that it agreed with the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, which in J.R. Christ "emphasiz[ed] the fact that water and 
sewer systems are essential to the comfortable and convenient use of dwellings." 600 
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P.2d at 526 (citing J.R. Christ, 221 A.2d at 541). The paving of roads is certainly 
essential to the comfortable and convenient use of a dwelling, particularly when that 
dwelling is to be constructed in a "high-end mountain subdivision." A-T Asphalt's Stmt. 
ofAdd'LFactsU4. 
In fact, the cutting, grading and paving of the roads by A-T Asphalt was part of the 
same development project being undertaken by Omnia Development as the general 
contractor, Kennedy Funding's Stmt, of Facts Tf 4, despite Kennedy Funding's attempt to 
drive a wedge in the center of the timeline of development to argue that paving was not 
"necessary." See Kennedy Funding's Brief at 24-25. The paving by A-T Asphalt was 
the culmination of several years of work and improvement as part of a single project. See 
Barnhart Depo., p. 5,1. 8-11; p. 7,1. 24-25; p. 8,1. 1-25; p. 9,1. 1-4 (R.682-83). In any 
road construction project, there are times when a road might be "driveable prior to the 
installation of pavement," Kennedy Funding's Brief at 25, but if such a test were applied 
in all cases, only the work completed before a road under construction became "drivable" 
would give rise to lien rights, while the work after that time would not. The district court 
was thus not in error to point out that accessibility was limited prior to the time work was 
completed by A-T Asphalt. R. 977 Memorandum Decision at 20. Furthermore, Kennedy 
Funding cites no support in its Brief for its interpretation of "habitable," as used in First 
of Denver, as meaning simply "driveable." Kennedy Funding's Brief at 25. 
In like manner, Kennedy Funding's interpretation of "habitable" would lead to the 
natural conclusion that cutting and grading of roads is necessary to make habitable and 
thus gives rise to a lien on adjoining property, but the paving of those same roads is not 
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necessary to make habitable and thus should not give rise to a lien. See id. The problem 
can be further demonstrated by analogy to the contrasts between a septic system vs. 
sewer system; or between a culinary water storage tank to which water must be hauled 
and stored vs. an underground culinary water delivery system; or dirt and gravel storm 
water improvements vs. concrete curbs, gutters, storm drains, and retention structures. 
The latter improvements in each of these contrasting pairs have been established by case 
law to give rise to liens on adjoining lots, even though the former improvements in each 
contrasting pair would probably have been sufficient to "make the 
residences.. .habitable." 600 P.2d at 525 (upholding lien for water and sewer); see, e.g., 
In re Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 15 B.R. 886, 887 (D.C.Colo. 1981) (upholding lien for 
water and sewer); J. R. Christ Const. Co., Inc. v. Willete Assoc, 47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 
538 (N.J. 1966) (upholding lien for storm and sanitary sewers). The key to understanding 
First of Denver in this context is that each of these improvements, though made on an 
off-site or publicly owned property, makes the use of a dwelling to be constructed more 
"comfortable and convenient." 600 P.2d at 525 (citing Ladue, 337 S.W.2d at 585). 
Finally, just as with the paving in this case, each of the latter improvements significantly 
improves and increases the value and desireability of the adjoining lots in a subdivision, 
which benefit is enjoyed solely by the developer or owner of those lots. 
As noted above, the Court in First of Denver cited favorably to the case of/. R. 
Christ Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs., 47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), stating that 
it "agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court," 600 P.2d at 525, going on to further cite 
the Ladue case, also relied on by the court in J. R. Christ. Id. (citing 221 A.2d at 541). 
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The /. R. Christ case and the cases on which it relies are instructive in rebutting the 
arguments of Kennedy Funding. 
In J, R. Christ, the owner of property which had been approved for subdivision 
into residential lots secured a contractor "for the construction of storm and sanitary 
sewers throughout the development." 221 A.2d at 539-40. According to the construction 
contract, "sewer mains were to be laid underneath the streets shown on the map. Small 
laterals were to be run from the mains to just inside the curb lines of the various building 
lots." Id. The main issue in the case was, similar to the case at hand, whether the 
improvements to land which would serve as public streets gave rise to lien rights upon 
adjoining building lots in the subdivision. Id. 
It may be safe to assume that this Court agreed with the court in / . R. Christ in part 
because the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed a very similar purpose for the New 
Jersey mechnaics' lien statutes, as this Court did for the parallel Utah laws: "Mechanics' 
lien statutes are remedial and are designed to guarantee effective security to those who 
furnish labor or materials used to enhance the value of the property of others, and, where 
the terms of the statute reasonably permit, the law should be construed to effect this 
remedial purpose." Id. at 540 (quoting Davis v. Mial, 86 N.J.L. 167, 169, 90 A. 315 (E. 
& A. 1914)). The J. R. Christ court also noted that: 
[New Jersey] courts have not required that materials or labor must be 
incorporated directly into a building before a mechanic's lien can arise. . . . 
[W]ork done which is reasonably necessary for the ultimate completion of a 
building should give rise to a mechanic's lien, even though the type of 
service provided is not as directly incorporated into the building as would 
be, for instance, the boards supplied by a lumber yard or the work 
performed by a carpenter. 
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Id. at 541 (citations omitted). The court further noted that sewer systems such as the one 
constructed in the subdivision at issue "are required to make homes habitable in a manner 
consistent with reasonable standards of comfort and health." Id.; see also Ladue, 337 
S.W.2dat585. 
As to the issue of what property benefitted from the improvements, the J. R. Christ 
Court stated: 
That the plaintiffs' work in this case was performed under land to be used 
as public streets, rather than on building lots, should not bar the plaintiffs 
from the statute's benefit where, as here, the work not only enhanced the 
value of defendant's land but was also necessary to make the homes being 
constructed suitable for habitation. 
Id. at 541. It should be noted that while the First of Denver case refers to a requirement 
that work make a property "habitable," the J. R. Christ court used the phrase "suitable for 
habitation"; which, though it might be viewed as generally equivalent, perhaps suggests 
that a more nuanced interpretation of this requirement is proper. In fact, the / . R. Christ 
Court does go on to further define "suitable for habitation" by observing that "a 
mechanic's lien will attach to property for any improvement not placed thereon if it has a 
physical or beneficial connection therewith and is essential to the convenient and 
comfortable use of the premises." Id. (citing Mitford v. Prior, 353 F.2d 550 (9 Cir. 
1965). This discussion, cited so favorably by this Court in First of Denver, when applied 
to the case at hand demonstrates the propriety of A-T Asphalt's lien for paving of the 
roads in the 3200 Subdivision. 
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The beneficial connection of the physical roadway to each individual lot that it 
serves is unmistakable. A-T Asphalt has established that the paved roadway provided the 
sole access to all of the liened lots, see Affidavit of Steven Barnhart ffif 13-14 (R.674-75). 
Furthermore, as recognized by the district court and discussed in detail above, it is 
undisputed that prior to the road improvements, the roads were "accessible only by foot, 
on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck." A-T Asphalt's St. of Add'l Facts \ 2, and 
"[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working 
financially," A-T Asphalt's St. of Add'l Facts f^ 4. Also as discussed above, Kennedy 
Funding's argument that the paving was not "necessary" to make the lots "habitable" 
does not defeat the fact that A-T Asphalt's paving work, as the pinnacle of the road 
improvements made to the subdivision by Omnia Development, certainly provided some 
measure of benefit to each of the residential lots to which access was made easier, more 
comfortable, and more convenient as a result of such paving. See First of Denver, 600 
P.2d at 525; J. R. Christ, 221 A.2d at 541; md Ladue, 337 S.W.2d at 585. 
Kennedy Funding also attempts to argue that the paving work completed by A-T 
Asphalt is not the equivalent of the sewer work at issue in First of Denver and in /. R. 
Christ, and on this basis attempts to distinguish these cases. Kennedy Funding's Brief at 
23. The district court in this case recognized the fact that the Ladue case itself, which is 
the original foundation of much of the rationale behind both /. R. Christ and First of 
Denver, recognized that the work of paving a public street can give rise to lien rights in 
adjoining residential lots, just as does sewer-related work in 7. R. Christ and First of 
Denver. Memorandum Decision at 19; 337 S.W. 2d at 585. The Ladue Court ultimately 
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held that the liens at issue in that case were valid, observing that "liens for paving streets 
adjacent to residential lots are applicable against those lots, even when the streets are 
public." Id. (citations omitted). 
Kennedy Funding also argues that if this Court rules on behalf of A-T Asphalt, the 
ruling ofFirst of Denver would be improperly extended and the Court's holding would 
sanction mechanics' liens on adjoining properties in many different extreme scenarios. 
Kennedy Funding's Brief at 31. However, the practical reality is that such extreme 
circumstances are already outside the bounds of the parameters set by the Court in prior 
cases. This Court has already addressed the issue of foreseeability in Stanton, 341 P.2d 
207. The district court addressed foreseeability as well in its Memorandum Decision at 
13-14. Section 38-1-3 itself requires that work must be "upon or concerning which" the 
property in question, according to the plain language of the statute, and it must be 
reasonably foreseeable. This Court has already drawn the line where an individual lot is 
involved as opposed to a subdivision development. John Holmes Construction, 2005 UT 
83, f 15; Western Mortgage, 424 P.2d at 439. Thus, the risk is minimal that such 
extreme hypothetical scenarios would occur as suggested by Kennedy Funding. 
In the current case, the developer worked on road and other subdivision 
improvements, having the roads cut in, putting in utilities and subgrade, putting in road 
base and then having A-T Asphalt complete the paving. See Aff. of Steven Barnhart, fflf 
12-15 (R.674). This work was in process throughout the development, and for the 
benefit of all 240 residential lots, for a period of over two years. See id., ^ j 12-15 (R.674-
75). Plus, A-T Asphalt had a contract with the general contractor on the project, Omnia 
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Development, to pave the road for the unquestioned purposes of enhancing the value of 
and improving access to the abutting lots. Id.; see also Kennedy Funding's St. of Facts f 
4. This is not a hypothetical question that takes the "foreseeability" issue to its extreme. 
The current case could not be more distinct from the extreme scenarios proposed by 
Kennedy Funding. 
Kennedy Funding posits that rather than the First of Denver, J. R. Christ, and 
Ladue series of cases, the Shelby and Brannan Sand cases should be controlling. 
Kennedy Funding's Brief at 26-29. In Shelby Contracting Co., Inc., v. Pizitz, 231 So.2d 
743 (Ala. 1970), the Alabama Supreme Court did hold that based upon the Alabama 
mechanics' lien statutes, improvements to a dedicated street could not be liened against 
abutting residential lots. Id. at 750. It must be noted, however, that the Alabama 
mechanics' lien statute being applied by the court in Shelby is different from the Utah 
statutes, and from §38-1-3 in particular, in one critical respect. As noted by the Shelby 
Court, the Alabama statute requires that improvements be completed "upon" the property 
"on" which the lien arises6; the applicable Utah statutes, as discussed in depth supra, do 
6
 The Alabama statute interpreted in the Shelby case reads in relevant part as follows: 
Every mechanic, person, firm, or corporation who shall do or perform 
any work, or labor upon, or furnish any material, fixture, enjing, boiler, 
or machinery for any building or improvement on land, or for repairing, 
altering, or beautifying the same, under or by virture of any contract 
with the owner or proprietor thereof, or his agent, architect, trustee, 
contractor, or subcontractor, upon complying with the provisions of this 
article, shall have a lien therefor on such building or improvements and on 
the land on which the same is situated, to the extent in ownership of all the 
right, title, and interest therein of the owner or proprietor. 
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not. Thus, the inquiry of the court in Alabama became simply whether the improvements 
to the public roadway were made upon property owned by the adjoining property owner 
or not. That inquiry is significantly different than the one before this Court. Thus Shelby 
is neither controlling nor instructive in the current case, and the analysis therein of 
whether the public street is owned by the abutting lot owner is immaterial. 
Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Improvement Co., 332 P.2d 892 
(Colo. 1958), is similarly distinguishable from the case at hand. The Colorado 
mechanics' lien statute being applied by the court in Brannan is also different from the 
Utah statutes, and §38-1-3, in the same critical respect as the Alabama statute discussed 
above. The Colorado statute provided that "[subcontractors . . . shall have a lien upon 
the property upon which they have rendered service or bestowed labor or for which they 
have furnished materials," 332 P.2d at 893 (emphasis in original) (quoting Colorado 
Revised Statutes §86-3-1 (1953)). The Brannan Court noted that "[i]n the express words 
of the statute . . . [the lien] is granted only upon the property upon which the labor, 
services and material are bestowed or rendered," id. at 894. In contrast, Utah's statute is 
broader in allowing liens for an "improvement to any premises in any manner" and the 
lien shall be "upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service." 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Utah's statute allows for liens 
on any property that has been improved by the contractor, even if the work was not 
directly on the land, but was "concerning" the land. 
Ala. Code s 37, Title 33 (1940) (emphasis added). The Shelby Court held that the 
language emphasized above required the improvement to actually be upon the lot that 
abuts the street, in order for a lien to arise thereon. 231 So.2d at 745. 
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Thus, the district court was correct when it concluded that the Shelby and Brannan 
cases should be distinguished from the case at hand, these cases being "the only two 
arguably relevant cases cited by [Kennedy Funding]." Memorandum Decision at 20-21. 
CONCLUSION 
Pavement of a dedicated road and improvement of that road from an ATV and 
four wheel drive trail, all of which was done with private funds under private contract 
with a subdivision developer as part of the subdivision's infra structure is not a "public 
improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. In addition, Utah 
distinguishes from liens on subdivision lots for work performed to develop the 
subdivision as opposed to work done on a single residential lot for a residential lot owner. 
Thus, A-T Asphalt's work was properly lienable against the subdivision lots. This Court 
should therefore affirm the ruling of the trial Court. 
DATED this ~] day of June 2010. 
SNOWJENSEN & REECE 
ewis P. Ree< 
atthew J. Ence 
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FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE INVESTORS 
and Citibank, N.A., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a limited 
partnership, et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE INVESTORS, 
et al, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a limited 
partnership, Bland Brothers, Inc., et al, Defendants 
and Appellant. 
Nos. 15696,16051. 
Aug. 24, 1979. 
Appeal was taken in separate but related proceed-
ings in the Second District Court, Davis County, J. 
Duffy Palmer, J., involving allocation of priorities 
between mortgagees foreclosing against real prop-
erty and competing lien claimants who provided 
services and materials for improvements to the 
property. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held, 
inter alia, that the trial court properly determined 
that the mechanics' and materialman's liens had pri-
ority over the trust deed. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
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STEWART, Justice: 
This appeal from the district court consolidates two 
separate but related proceedings. These proceedings 
involve the allocation of priorities between mort-
gagees foreclosing against real property in Davis 
County, Utah, and competing lien claimants who 
provided services and materials for improvements 
to the property. 
Plaintiffs, First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
("FDMI") and Citibank, N.A., were granted a judg-
ment against defendant Mountain Springs by the 
trial court on December 20, 1977, in the amount of 
$2,358,396.08. The amount represented 
$1,558,005.51 in outstanding principal and 
$800,390.57 in interest. The judgment was secured 
by a lien on the Lakeview Terrace subdivision. The 
court's conclusions of law include the following: 
4. Plaintiffs have stipulated in open court that they 
shall bid only the sum of one million nine hundred 
thousand for said property (at the sheriffs sale) and 
take no deficiency judgment against the defendant, 
Mountain Springs Construction* 523 Company, nor 
against any of the individual guarantors. 
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The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure states: 
The priority of the mechanic's and materialmen's li-
ens is reserved for future determination and shall be 
set forth in a supplemental Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sheriffs Sale. 
The Decree further provides: 
. . . that the proceeds of sale be applied in payment 
of the Sheriffs cost of sale and thereafter to the 
parties in accordance with the priority to be determ-
ined by the court 
The court subsequently entered its order awarding 
priority to mechanics' liens claimed by eight de-
fendants. The appeal from that order by plaintiffs is 
Case No. 15696 in this Court. 
In a consolidated case, No. 16051, defendant Bland 
Brothers, Inc. ("Bland Bros.") appeals from the 
lower court's denial of its motion to set aside the 
sheriffs sale held pursuant to the foreclosure action 
and raises procedural issues in connection there-
with. We shall examine first the common facts un-
derlying these cases and then deal separately with 
the issues raised on appeal. 
This litigation concerns a subdivision which origin-
ally comprised 44 acres in Bountiful, Utah, known 
as Lakeview Terrace subdivision. A trust deed was 
recorded as to this property on August 1, 1973, 
when plaintiff FDMI made a loan of $450,000 to 
C.N. Zundel and Associates, a limited partnership. 
In November 1973 defendant Child Brothers, Inc. 
("Child Bros.") commenced the first work on the 
property for C.N. Zundel. The work consisted of 
locating existing lines and putting in pipeline, water 
and sewer systems, and storm drains. Subsequently, 
the original FDMI loan was refinanced, and the 
1973 trust deed released, with FDMI advancing 
$1,500,000 to Zundel and several limited partners. 
This amount was secured by a new trust deed recor-
ded on February 19, 1974. The construction loan 
was for the financing of improvements on the 
44-acre property, which was to comprise 54 single-
family building sites and 69 condominium units. 
The loan was due and payable on January 15, 1976. 
On August 8, 1975, Zundel conveyed the property 
to Mountain Springs Construction Company, whose 
stockholders were the same individuals who had 
been Zundel's limited partners. Because Zundel had 
become delinquent on the FDMI loan, FDMI on 
September 8, 1975, filed its first complaint for fore-
closure. In November FDMI concluded a supple-
mental loan agreement with Mountain Springs, the 
successor to C.N. Zundel and Associates, which 
modified the construction loan so as to require re-
payment in installments in July 1976, October 
1976, July 1977, and December 1977. 
The following lien claimants first performed work 
on the Lakeview property for Mountain Springs on 
the dates indicated: Child Bros., November 15, 
1973; Duncan Electric, January 22, 1975; Robert J. 
Wardrop, December 1, 1975; Countertop Shop, 
Inc., March 9, 1976; Max D. Scheel, April 19, 
1976; Ronald Graham Tile Co., March 23, 1976; 
and Bland Bros., March 8, 1976. Additionally, 
Holt-Witmer provided wallpaper and linoleum un-
der contract with Zundel commencing January 1, 
1975. Except for Child Bros., the lien claimants all 
performed labor or furnished materials on various 
condominium units situated on the property. [FN1] 
FN1. On June 13, 1979, orders of dismissal 
based on settlements between the parties 
were entered in this Court dismissing the 
following parties: Child Bros., Duncan 
Electric, Countertop Shop, and Holt- Witmer. 
In June 1976 Child Bros., as credit in the approxim-
ate amount of $22,000 toward the sum owed by 
Zundel and Mountain Springs, accepted a check for 
$13,210 and a warranty deed to two lots in the sub-
division. FDMI's trust deed provided that the title to 
the property deeded to Child Bros, would revert to 
FDMI if the required payment was not made by Ju-
ly 1, 1976. In exchange for the payment in cash and 
property, Child Bros, executed a release of all liens 
and *524 claims. The release was recorded on June 
22, 1976. 
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Mountain Springs failed to pay the July 1976 in-
stallment on its note to FDMI. A partial assignment 
of the promissory note and trust deed from FDMI to 
Citibank, N.A., was recorded on July 30, 1976, and 
FDMI and Citibank on August 2, 1976, filed an 
amended complaint seeking foreclosure of the prop-
erty. Mountain Springs answered, counter-claimed 
for damages, and. filed a lis pendens against the 
property. One year later Child Bros, cross-claimed 
for money due and failure of warranty on the lots 
conveyed to it. Subsequently, the plaintiffs and the 
lien claimant defendants moved for summary judg-
ment. 
Following the December 20, 1977, hearing, 
plaintiffs were awarded a judgment against Moun-
tain Springs; the question of lien priority was re-
served for later determination. The sheriffs sale 
took place on January 19, 1978. Plaintiff FDMI bid 
$1,900,000 for the property; no higher bids were re-
ceived. On January 24, the court entered a Memor-
andum Decision awarding the lien claimants first 
priority over the plaintiffs. That ruling involved 
total liens in the undisputed amount of $37,397.42. 
In making its ruling, the court in effect rejected a 
stipulation signed by attorneys for Child Bros, and 
FDMI on January 11, 1978, that Child Bros.' lien 
was junior to the trust deed. The provisions of the 
Memorandum Decision were embodied in the 
court's Order Granting Summary Judgment and Or-
der Amending Certificate of Sale on February 1, 
1978. Pursuant to this order, the sheriffs certificate 
of sale was amended to change plaintiffs bid to 
$1,937,397.42. On February 16, 1978, following 
the entry of a summary judgment in favor of lien 
claimant Holt-Witmer, the court entered another or-
der requiring "that the sheriffs certificate of sale 
shall be amended to show that plaintiffs bid for the 
property is the sum of $1,944,732.86." 
Child Bros.' cross-claim and counterclaims against 
Zundel, Mountain Springs, and plaintiffs were dis-
missed following a trial on February 1, 1978. Child 
Bros.' counsel was not present at the trial for reas-
ons set out in an affidavit filed with Child Bros.' ap-
pellate brief. 
On these facts, the plaintiffs FDMI and Citibank in 
Case No. 15696 seek reversal of the summary judg-
ment dated February 1, 1978, awarding the named 
lien claimants priority over plaintiffs' trust deed. 
Plaintiffs contend that liens for materials furnished 
for construction in Lakeview Terrace could not re-
late back to the date of the first work commenced 
on November 15, 1973, by Child Bros, for two ba-
sic reasons. First, plaintiffs characterize Child 
Bros.' work as "off-site improvements" and argue 
that liens arising subsequent to such improvements 
and after the recording of plaintiffs' trust deed 
which relate to specific structures cannot relate 
back to the date of the commencement of Child 
Bros.' work. Second, plaintiffs rely on Child Bros.' 
release of its claims to a lien for work performed 
prior to June 17, 1976. Plaintiffs further argue that 
the work done in October 1976 by Child Bros, was 
not under the same contract as work done previ-
ously by Child Bros, on Lakeview Terrace and was 
therefore, as stipulated by Child Bros., junior and 
subordinate to plaintiffs' trust deed. 
Whether the lower court decided the question of li-
en priority properly depends on a consideration of 
several propositions of law underlying plaintiffs' 
contentions. 
The first issue is whether the improvements by 
Child Bros, met the general statutory requirements 
under Utah law for the attachment of mechanics' li-
ens. The Utah lien statute, s 38-l-3,[FN2] lists the 
following persons among those entitled to a mech-
anics' lien: "Contractors, subcontractors and all per-
sons performing any services or furnishing any ma-
terials used in the construction, alteration, or im-
provement of any building or structure or improve-
ment to any premises in any manner . . .." 
FN2. All statutory references are to Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
"The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect those 
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who have added directly to the value of property by 
performing labor *525 or furnishing materials upon 
it," Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 
184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959). The broad lan-
guage, "improvement to any premises in any man-
ner," encompasses the instant case where sewer and 
water systems were installed on the subject prop-
erty. 
[1][2] It is not necessary to the attachment of a 
mechanics' lien that the material or labor be fur-
nished solely on a building structure or that the 
work be performed solely on the lot on which a 
building is being erected. We agree with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J. R. Christ 
Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs., 47 NJ. 473, 
221 A.2d 538 (1966), that a contractor should not 
be barred from enjoying the benefits of the mechan-
ics' lien statute where his work not only enhances 
the value of the developer's land, but is also neces-
sary to make residences to be built on such property 
habitable. The court held that where a developer en-
gages the contractor to install a sewer system for a 
subdivision project, the contractor, if he complies 
with required statutory procedures, is entitled to a 
mechanics' lien against the developer's property for 
the cost of labor and materials furnished. The New 
Jersey Court cited Ladue Contracting Co. v. Land 
Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578 (Mo.App.1960), 
in emphasizing the fact that water and sewer sys-
tems are essential to the comfortable and conveni-
ent use of dwellings and that it would be "turn(ing) 
the clock back to another century" to hold that such 
improvements are outside the terms of the lien stat-
ute. (Id. at 585). 
The second issue is whether the priority of materi-
almen's liens is different with respect to a blanket 
construction loan for a subdivision comprising 
single dwelling lots and condominiums as com-
pared with a construction loan for a single dwelling 
in a subdivision where there may have been 
"off-site" improvements that would not impart no-
tice to lenders of the latter type of loan. Plaintiffs 
rely on this Court's decision in Western Mortgage 
Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967), to support their 
argument that our mechanics' lien statute provides 
that liens are to date back only to the time each in-
dividual structure was commenced. 
Western Mortgage involved the relative priorities 
of mechanics' liens and a construction mortgage on 
a single lot in a subdivision. The question was 
whether lien claimants who had furnished labor or 
materials that went into the construction of the 
house on that single lot were entitled to tack for pri-
ority purposes to work comprising "off-site im-
provements," i. e., the laying out the subdivision 
and the installation of water lines, sewer, curb and 
gutter, and street paving done earlier in connection 
with the subdivision as a whole. The lien claimants 
cited s 38-1-5, which reads in part as follows: 
Priority Over other encumbrances. The liens herein 
provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as 
of, the time of the commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have at-
tached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished on the ground . . . . 
This Court held that the recorded construction 
mortgage took priority over the mechanics' liens 
because in that case the liens could not relate back 
to the date of commencement of off-site improve-
ments. The decision rested on the issue of notice. 
The Court stated, 18 Utah 2d at 412, 424 P.2d at 439: 
The presence of materials on the building site or 
evidence on the ground that work has commenced 
on a structure or preparatory thereto is notice to all 
the world that liens may have attached. However, 
the off-site construction in developing the subdivi-
sion for building sites would not necessarily bring 
to the attention of a lender that someone is claiming 
a lien on a particular lot in the subdivision. This is 
especially true as in this case, where the lender ad-
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vanced money *526 to build a home long after the 
subdivision had been laid out and developed. 
[3] The instant case, however, is distinguishable 
from Western Mortgage. Here we are not dealing 
with a lender who made a loan on a single lot with-
in a subdivision and who had no reason to be on no-
tice as to the existence of prior work. In this case, 
the initial work performed by Child Bros, related to 
and benefited the entire subdivision. The mortgage 
loan in question was a blanket mortgage covering 
the entire subdivision. Because the initial work was 
performed over substantial portions of the property 
involved, it could not properly be characterized as 
being "off-site" as were the improvements in West-
ern Mortgage in relation to the property that was 
the subject of the construction loan. Furthermore, 
the claimant of the mechanics' lien in Western 
Mortgage performed the labor on a lot entirely sep-
arate from the initial work. In the present case the 
claimants performed their work on the same site, i. 
e., the 44 acres covered by FDMI's construction loan. 
Plaintiffs also cite Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trust-
ees of Cent. States, Nevada, 563 P.2d 82 (1977), in 
which the court refused to relate mechanics' liens 
back to pre-construction architectural, soil testing, 
and survey work. The court in Aladdin required 
"visible signs of construction to inform prospective 
lenders (who inspected) the premises that liens had 
attached," and the work performed in that case and 
others cited therein resulted in nothing that would 
put a lender on notice because of the visibility of 
the work. In the instant case Child Bros, laid water 
line and sewer pipe for the subdivision, commen-
cing its first work on November 15, 1973. The trial 
court made no specific findings as to the visibility 
of Child Bros.' work at the time the loan agreement 
was entered into, and this issue was not raised or 
argued by plaintiffs. The work done by Child Bros., 
however was concededly more substantial than that 
done in Aladdin. Accordingly, Aladdin is distin-
guishable from the present case. 
Based on our statute and the issues submitted by the 
parties, the materialmen with valid liens stand, in 
this case, on equal footing in dating their liens from 
the time work commenced. We therefore hold that 
the mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing of 
materials and labor both on the overall development 
site and on individual condominium units within 
the development relate back to the initial work done 
on the project by Child Bros. 
A third issue involves the effect of Child Bros.' ex-
ecution in June 1976 of a document titled "Release 
of All Liens and Claims" pertaining to the 
Lakeview property. The notarized release document 
recited that for a valuable consideration Child 
Brothers, Inc., by its president, Eugene Child, who 
signed the document, "release(d) and discharge(d)" 
Mountain Springs, FDMI, Zundel, and the 
Lakeview subdivision property, 
from any and all liens, claims, demands, damages, 
actions at law or in equity . . . arising out of any 
contractual or other relationship . . . and/or claims 
of liens, arising or accruing on or before (date 
omitted), or existing on that date . . . and all mat-
ters involved in any and all claims of liens for all 
labor performed upon, and all materials furnished 
to (the Lakeview subdivision property) arising on 
or before, or existing on, the date specified above, 
by the undersigned, and by all agents, employees, 
suppliers, (etc.) . . . all of whom the undersigned 
hereby warrants have been fully paid, and none of 
whom has any further claim or lien against such 
real estate as of the date specified above.. . . 
That the parties hereto intend hereby that this Re-
lease of AH Liens and Claims shall be a final and 
complete release and discharge of (Mountain 
Springs, FDMI, Zundel, and the Lakeview subdivi-
sion) by the undersigned, (his heirs, assigns, agents, 
employees, etc.), and all other persons performing 
labor upon or furnishing materials . . . as of the date 
specified above, at the instance of the undersigned. 
The document was dated June 17, 1976; it was re-
corded on June 22, 1976. 
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*527 As this Court stated in upholding the waiver 
of lien rights in Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper 
Mfg. Co., 14 Utah 339, 344, 47 P. 311, 312 (1896), 
"A mechanic's lien is a privilege conferred by stat-
ute, and ordinarily may be waived by express 
agreement of the party in whose favor it exists." 
The legitimacy of a release of lien rights was also 
recognized in G. Chicoine Contractors, Inc. v. John 
Marshal Bldg. Corp, 77 IU.App.2d 437, 222 
N.E.2d 712, 714 (1966), where the court stated, 
"One right the lien claimant has is to execute his 
full and general waiver releasing his rights to a 
mechanic's lien against the property." The court 
then quoted the following language from Decatur 
Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Crail, 350 111. 319, 324, 
183 N.E. 228, 230 (1932): 
While a waiver of lien for a clearly expressed spe-
cial purpose will be confined by the courts to the 
purpose intended, yet, where a general waiver is ex-
ecuted, and there is nothing in the context to show a 
contrary intention, there is nothing left for the court 
to do but enforce the contract as the parties have 
made it. 
[4] To be valid and binding a waiver or release of a 
mechanics' lien by contract or agreement must be 
supported by a legal consideration. Kelly v. John-
son, 251 111. 135, 95 N.E. 1068 (1911); Skidmore v. 
Eby, 57 N.M. 669, 262 P.2d 370 (1953). Child 
Bros., received cash and property in exchange for 
the release. Its release of lien rights is therefore 
binding as to those rights accrued up to the time of 
the release, at least as to it. 
[5] As to the lien claimants left in the case, all then-
work on the project was completed prior to the date 
of Child Bros.' release. Their lien rights had already 
attached. These lienholders were not parties to the 
release, did not consent to its terms, and are not in 
the category of subcontractors or materialmen per-
forming labor or furnishing materials at the in-
stance of Child Bros., and therefore the release does 
not affect their status as lienholders. They are en-
titled to the same priority date as that originally ac-
corded Child Bros., whose work was the first done 
on the project, in accordance with U.C.A. s 38-1-10 
, which provides: 
The liens for work and labor done or material fur-
nished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an 
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice 
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of per-
forming such work and labor or furnishing such 
material. 
A final issue relating to lien priority in this case is 
whether the stipulation that Child's lien was junior 
to plaintiffs' had any binding legal effect. The stipu-
lation was signed by attorneys for FDMI and Child 
Bros, on the 11th of January, 1978. It states that 
Child Bros, released its lien against the Lakeview 
property and that Child Bros, was the grantee in a 
warranty deed recorded June 22, 1976, covering 
Lots 59 and 60, Lakeview Terrace. The second 
paragraph states: 
Said parties hereby stipulate that the warranty deed 
is junior and subordinate to the lien or (sic) 
plaintiffs Trust Deed And that defendant Child 
Bros. Inc. has a lien in the sum of $13,450.52 
which lien is junior and subordinate to plaintiffs 
Trust Deed. (Emphasis added.) 
[6] [7] Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations 
between parties, Koron v. Myers, 87 Idaho 567, 394 
P.2d 634 (1964); Riordan v. Commercial Travelers 
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Wash.App. 707, 525 P.2d 804 
(1974). Such is not the case, however, when points 
of law requiring judicial determination are in-
volved, Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211 Kan. 833, 
508 P.2d 889 (1973); In Re Estate of Maguire, 204 
Kan. 686, 466 P.2d 358, modified 206 Kan. 1, 476 
P.2d 618 (1970); Cox v. City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 
225, 291 P.2d 282 (1955). Parties are bound by 
their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the 
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation 
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause, 
Klein v. Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472 (1975); Johnson 
v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 
272 P.2d 171 (1954); Guard v. County of Maricopa, 
14 Ariz.App. 187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971); Higby v. 
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Higby, ColoApp., 538 P.2d 493 (1975); Thompson 
v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 558 P.2d 1071 (1977). 
*528 [8] [9] In the present case, the trial court ap-
parently disregarded the stipulation of FDMI and 
Child Bros, as to lien priority. The record contains 
no findings as to the validity or effect of the stipu-
lation, and this Court will not consider this matter 
for the first time on appeal. Whatever the effect of 
the stipulation upon Child Bros.' priority status, the 
other lien claimants who sought priority over 
FDMI's trust deed are in no way bound by a stipula-
tion to which they were not parties, Thomas v. 
State, 57 Haw. 639, 562 P.2d 425 (1977). 
[10] Bland Bros., also a defendant in Case No. 
15696, raises the further issues that this appeal is 
both moot and premature. Mootness is claimed be-
cause plaintiff FDMI has bid $1,944,732.86 [FN3] 
for the property at the sheriffs sale and is thus re-
quired to pay that amount to the sheriff pursuant to 
Rule 69(e)(4), which states that every bid shall be 
deemed an irrevocable offer and that the purchaser 
is liable on such bid. Because the amount bid would 
satisfy fully the claims of the lienors, as well as 
plaintiffs, defendants claim that the plaintiffs have 
no grounds for bringing an appeal. Plaintiffs con-
ceded that should someone pay the amount of 
$1,944,732.86 during the redemption period, the li-
en claimants would receive $44,732.86, and the ap-
peal would become moot. Otherwise, plaintiffs ar-
gue that this Court should determine the lien 
claimants to be junior and subordinate to their trust 
deed. Bland Bros, claims that the redemption period 
cannot expire where no payment has been made 
pursuant to the order of sale. 
FN3. Since this case is to be remanded to 
the trial court, we leave to that court the 
determination of what effect the settle-
ments made during the pendency of the ap-
peal (see Footnote 1) should make with re-
spect to plaintiffs' bid. 
The record shows that plaintiffs themselves stipu-
lated to the amount to be bid and moved the trial 
court on the 11th day of February, 1978, to amend 
the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to provide that the 
total amount to be paid was $1,944,732.86, in the 
event that lien claimant Holt-Witmer was granted 
first priority. An order was signed by the court so 
amending the certificate of sale. Plaintiffs' objec-
tions at this point are more a change of mind than a 
justifiable claim of error on the part of the trial 
court. Although a sheriffs deed was issued to the 
plaintiffs, they have not paid the amount bid into 
the court as ordered and thus should not have re-
ceived a deed. The lien claimants who had been ad-
judged to have first priority have not been paid. The 
issues raised herein are not moot. 
[11] Defendant Bland Bros, also argues that this ap-
peal is premature because various cross-claims and 
counterclaims have not been resolved. Unless an 
appeal may be taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
U.R.C.P., or our interlocutory appeal procedure, 
only "final orders" are appealable to this Court, see 
Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P. Bland Bros, claims that there 
was no final order until lien claimant Holt-Witmer's 
priority status was adjudicated on February 22, 1978. 
The order of February 22, 1978, was an amendment 
to the order dated February 1, 1978. Although the 
notice of appeal states that it is the February 1 order 
that is appealed, we deem that order to incorporate 
by amendment the order of February 22 since it was 
entered prior to the filing of the notice of appeal. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that certain cross-claims and 
counterclaims unrelated to the issue of lien priority 
remain to be adjudicated. 
Whether an order is deemed a "final order" is not 
necessarily dependent in all instances upon whether 
all issues in a lawsuit have been adjudicated. The 
test to be applied is a pragmatic test. See Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 
1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962); Wright, Federal 
Courts, 505 (3rd ed.). In the instant case no further 
judicial action remains to be taken with respect to 
the issues of priority and the sale of the property; 
and, but for the appeal, sale of the property and dis-
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
600P.2d521 
(Cite as: 600 P.2d 521) 
Page 10 
bursement of the proceeds would occur. To require 
the appeal to abide the determination of pending 
unrelated claims would make an appeal on the issue 
of priorities moot. Unless an appeal may be taken at 
this point, *529 substantial property interests may 
be destroyed since the sheriffs sale would proceed 
and the money would be disbursed on the basis of 
the priorities determined by the trial court. With the 
issuance of a sheriffs deed and the disbursement of 
monies, the legal rights and obligations of the 
parties are finally established. Accordingly, under a 
pragmatic view of the test of finality, the order ap-
pealed in this case is final. 
Consolidated with the appeal of FDMI and Citibank 
in Case No. 15696 is an appeal by Bland Bros., 
Case No. 16051, which challenges the refusal of the 
trial court to set aside the sheriffs sale held pursu-
ant to the foreclosure order. The facts pertaining to 
this appeal may be set out briefly. The Lakeview 
Terrace property was offered at a sheriffs sale on 
January 19, 1978. FDMI, pursuant to its agreement, 
bid the sum (as amended) of $1,944,732.86, and 
subsequently received the sheriffs deed to the prop-
erty. Before the deed was issued, and when the nor-
mal six-month redemption period was about to ex-
pire, Bland Bros, moved the lower court to vacate 
the sale because plaintiff FDMI had failed to pay 
the amount of its bid into the court as had been 
ordered. The trial court in an order dated August 
15, 1978, denied the motion, stating that its juris-
diction was lost when the appeal regarding lien pri-
orities was taken to the Supreme Court. The court 
on its own motion ordered FDMI to post a super-
sedeas bond in the amount of the claims of the 
mechanics' lienholders who had been adjudged to 
have first priority. 
[12] Bland Bros, argues that the lower court re-
tained jurisdiction over the enforcement of its de-
cree inasmuch as no supersedeas bond was posted 
prior to the sheriffs sale or before Bland Bros.' mo-
tion to have the sale vacated. This position is cor-
rect and is sustained by this Court's opinion in 
Skeen v. Pratt, 87 Utah 121, at 125, 48 P.2d 457, at 
458 (1935), which stated: 
As an incident to the authority remaining in the trial 
court to enforce a decree of foreclosure, where an 
appeal is had without a supersedeas bond or stay, is 
the authority to compel compliance with the law 
with respect to the execution of process, and if for 
any reason such process is improperly executed, 
then and in such case to vacate the improper pro-
ceeding had pursuant to the process, and order the 
issuance of another in lieu thereof. The court below 
was in error in holding that it was without jurisdic-
tion to hear and determine the motion to vacate the 
order of sale. 
Bland Bros, also points out a defect in the publica-
tion of notice of the sheriffs sale, namely that there 
was no publication in a Davis County newspaper in 
the week immediately preceding the sale as re-
quired by Rule 69(e) (1), (3), U.R.C.P. Since this 
issue should be considered by the trial court in con-
nection with the determination as to the validity of 
the sheriffs sale, we decline to deal with it here. 
Our decision regarding the priority issue makes it 
unnecessary to rule on additional matters argued by 
the parties herein. It is the opinion of this Court that 
the lower court was correct in granting priority to 
the mechanics' lien claimants inasmuch as the ini-
tial work by Child Bros, established the priority 
date for all who provided labor and services on the 
Lakeview Terrace subdivision. The action of the 
trial court as to the setting of priorities is therefore 
affirmed as it pertains to the lien claimants who re-
main as parties to this appeal. 
We affirm the trial court's determination that the 
mechanics' and materialmen's liens of the defend-
ants whose appeal has not been dismissed have pri-
ority over FDMI's trust deed. We remand for any 
necessary consideration the issues raised with re-
spect to the sheriffs sale. 
Costs to defendants. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a corporation et al., Defendants, 
Oscar E. Chytraus Company, Inc., a corporation, 
Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Company, a 
corporation, Richard P. Garrick, Boise Cascade 
Corporation, a corporation, Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
No. 10516. 
Feb. 27, 1967. 
Action involving priorities of construction mort-
gage and mechanics' liens. The Third District Court 
for Sale Lake County, Aldon J. Anderson, J., made 
findings as to relative priorities of mechanics' len-
ors and mortgagee, and the lienors took an inter-
locutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., 
held that construction money mortgage providing 
that mortgage will also secure additional loans 
made by the then holder of the note secured to the 
then owner of the real estate described, provided 
that no such additional loan would be made if the 
making thereof would cause the total indebtedness 
secured to exceed the amount of the original in-
debtedness, created obligation on part of lender to 
pay over funds in accordance with borrower's direc-
tions and mortgagee had priority for monies actu-
ally advanced under mortgages over liens for ma-
terials furnished subsequent to recording of mort-
gages. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, J., dissented in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Mortgages 266 €^>151(3) 
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266 Mortgages 
266III Construction and Operation 
266111(D) Lien and Priority 
266kl51 Priorities of Mortgages in Gen-
eral 
266kl51(3) k. Mortgages and Mechan-
ics' or Contractors' Liens in General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Construction money mortgage providing that mort-
gage would secure additional loans made by the 
then holder of the note secured to the then owner of 
the real estate described but providing that no such 
additional loan would be made if the making there-
of would cause the total indebtedness secured to ex-
ceed the amount of the original indebtedness, cre-
ated obligation on part of lender to pay over funds 
in accordance with borrower's directions, and mort-
gagee thus had priority for monies actually ad-
vanced under mortgage over liens for materials fur-
nished subsequent to recording of mortgage. 
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
[2] Mechanics' Liens 257 €==>173 
257 Mechanics' Liens 
257IV Operation and Effect 
257IV(A) Amount and Extent of Lien 
257kl65 Time of Accrual or Commence-
ment 
257kl73 k. Relation Back. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statute providing for mechanics' lien upon 
"commencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground" is limited to the home or other struc-
ture which is being or about to be built upon the 
land, and liens for labor or materials furnished in 
off-site improvements in connection with laying out 
and construction of facilities used in connection 
with subdivision as a whole would not relate back 
and take effect as of time first work was done in re-
spect to laying out the subdivision and the installa-
tion of water lines, sewers, curbs and gutters and 
street paving. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
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257 Mechanics' Liens 
257IV Operation and Effect 
2571V(B) Property, Estates, and Rights Af-
fected 
257kl81 Extent of Land Affected 
257kl83 k. Separate Lots or Buildings. 
Most Cited Cases 
Presence of materials on building site or evidence 
on the ground that work has commenced on struc-
ture or preparatory thereto is notice to all the world 
that liens may have attached however, off-site con-
struction in developing subdivision for building 
sites would not necessarily bring to attention of 
lendor that someone might be claiming lien to par-
ticular lot, especially where lendor advances con-
struction money to build home long after subdivi-
sion has been developed. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5. 
**437 *410 VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & Mc-
Carthy, Fabian & Clendenin, Cannon, Duffin & 
Pace, Mark & Schoenhals, Neslen & Mock, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
Halliday & Halliday, Backman, Backman & Clark, 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent. 
**438 TUCKETT, Justice. 
This case is now before the court on an inter-
locutory appeal. It involves the relative priorities of 
mechanics lienors' and a construction mortgage 
which the plaintiff and respondent seeks to fore-
closure on lot 10, Lazy Bar Subdivision of Salt 
Lake County. 
The district court made certain rulings of which the 
following two are the subject of this appeal: 
1. That the documents evidencing the mortgage 
transaction between the plaintiff-respondent, West-
ern Mortgage Loan Corporation and the defendant, 
Cottonwood Construction Company, provided for 
obligatory or nonvolitional advances, and that such 
advances together with attorneys fees and costs take 
Page 2 
priority as of the time of the recording of the mort-
gage. 
2. A denial of the mechanics lienors' motion for a 
partial summary judgment to the effect that certain 
work constituted the 'commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement' within the meaning of Section 
38-1-5, U.C.A.1953. 
*411 The work of laying out and developing the 
subdivision, including engineering, installing water 
mains, sewer mains and laterals, curb and gutter, 
surfacing streets and other off-site construction was 
accomplished by Cottonwood Construction Com-
pany (the mortgagor) and its predecessors. The lat-
eral sewer line installed on Lot 10 terminated inside 
the lot. The sewer and lateral were completed about 
January 1, 1961. Water mains were completed 
about August, 1962, streets, curb and gutter were 
commenced in 1961 and completed in 1962. 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company erected utility poles in the subdivision, 
including one on Lot 10. 
Application for a construction loan was made to 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and approved. 
A note and mortgage in the amount of $15,750.00 
were executed October 29, 1962, and the mortgage 
was recorded that day. 
A separate loan agreement was entered into 
between Western and Cottonwood Construction 
Company, which provided in part that in event of 
default on the part of the mortgagor, Western was 
released from all further obligations to the borrow-
er, or in the alternative, it could take possession of 
the premises, finish the improvements and charge 
the costs to the borrower to be secured on the note 
and mortgage. 
When it later became apparent that Cottonwood had 
misapplied funds advanced by Western, the latter 
elected to complete the home. At the time Western 
took over the construction it had advanced approx-
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imately $9,500. An additional sum of about $5,000 
was used to complete the home on Lot 10. 
[1] A provision of the note and mortgage is as fol-
lows: 'This mortgage shall also secure additional 
loans hereafter made by the then holder of the note 
secured hereby to the then owner of the real estate 
described herein, provided that no such additional 
loan shall be made if the making thereof would 
cause the total indebtedness secured hereby to ex-
ceed the amount of the original indebtedness stated 
herein.' 
It is the appellants' contention that the language of 
the note and mortgage quoted above provided for 
nonvolitional or nonobligatory advances and that 
each advance made thereunder takes priority only 
as of its date. 
Under the construction loan agreement Western 
was obligated to pay out the funds as the building 
progressed. We are of the opinion that the agree-
ment to disburse the funds created an obligation on 
the part of lender to pay over the funds in accord-
ance with the borrower's directions.[FN 1] We see 
no distinction between the mortgage in Utah Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Mecham*412 [FN2] 
and the mortgage before us in this **439 case. Un-
der the terms of the loan agreement Western was 
obligated to deposit the net proceeds of the loan in 
a separate account to be expended in accordance 
with the agreement. The mortgage provides for ad-
ditional loans to be secured by the mortgage, never-
theless, the instrument is for a single fixed amount, 
and no additional loans were in fact made. 
FN1. Utah Savings & Loan Association 
v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598. 
FN2. Ibid; Valley Lumber Co. v. Wright, 2 
Cal.App. 288, 84 P. 58; Home Savings & 
Loan Association v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688, 
56 P. 940; see also anno. 76 A.L.R. 1402; 
80 A.L.R.2d 191; 57 C.J.S. Mechanics Li-
ens s 205, p. 774. 
The appellants' second assignment of error relates 
to the court's denial of the motion for summary 
judgment based upon a finding that the facts set 
forth in the supporting affidavits did not constitute 
'commencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground for the structure or improvement's with-
in the meaning of Section 38-1-5 U.C.A.1953. The 
appellants claim they are entitled to have their liens 
relate back and take effect as of the time the first 
work was done in respect to laying out the subdivi-
sion and the installation of water lines, sewers, curb 
and gutters and street paving. 
[2] [3] We are not inclined to give the statute such a 
broad meaning as contended for by the appellants. 
We are inclined to the view that the legislature in-
tended the language 'commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground' to be limited to re-
late to the home or other structure which was being 
or about to be built upon the land. To tack the liens 
for labor or materials that went into the construc-
tion of the house to the liens that may have arisen 
for labor and materials furnished in off-site im-
provements in connection with the laying out and 
construction of facilities used in connection with 
the subdivision as a whole would be going beyond 
the intent of the statute. The problem is one of no-
tice. The presence of materials on the building site 
or evidence on the ground that work has com-
menced on a structure or preparatory thereto is no-
tice to all the world that liens may have attached. 
However, the off-site construction in developing 
the subdivision for building sites would not neces-
sarily bring to the attention of a lender that 
someone is claiming a lien on a particular lot in the 
subdivision. This is especially true as in this case, 
where the lender advanced money to build a home 
long after the subdivision had been laid out and de-
veloped. It is apparent that the persons who sup-
plied labor or materials for the construction of 
roads, sewers, etc., could have filed liens for unpaid 
balances due them, if any. The erection of the home 
was separate and severable*413 from the earlier 
work in developing the subdivision. [FN3] 
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FN3. National Lumber Co. v. Farmer & 
Son, Inc. et al, 251 Minn. 100, 87 N.W.2d 
32; Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, Inc. et 
al., 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 146, 1 
A.L.R.3d815. 
The orders and rulings of the district court are af-
firmed. Costs to respondent. 
CALLISTER and ELLET, JJ., concur.CROCKETT, 
Chief Justice (concurring specially): 
I agree that under the facts as disclosed in this case 
a mortgage for a definite amount, which is recorded 
prior to the attachment of any lien rights, should 
under normal circumstances take preference up to 
the amount that is paid out under the terms of the 
recorded mortgage agreement. But I desire to note 
that there may be situations in which the lending in-
stitution is holding money not yet advanced on a 
building, when it acquires actual knowledge that 
the builder is diverting money to some other pur-
pose, and knows that the laborers or materialmen 
are not being paid and will not be paid. Under such 
circumstances the financier certainly should not be 
permitted to go on paying the money to a builder 
and thus in effect assist in cheating the laborers and 
materialmen out of their pay and preclude them 
**440 from the right to lien protection. See dissent-
ing opinion of Jones, District Judge, in Utah Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 
335,336P.2d598. 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in that portion of the main opinion with re-
spect to commencement of work, etc., but dissent 
from that portion having to do with priority of liens 
of materialmen. 
The main opinion says, 'We see no distinction 
between the mortgage in Utah Savings & Loan As-
sociation v. Mechan.' This statement is disarming. 
True, there is no difference in the recorded mort-
gage, upon which Utah Savings relied, and the one 
here. The fallacy of the main opinion's conclusion 
lies in its assumption that the cause of action in the 
Utah Savings case was identical to this present 
Western Mortgage case. The former was based on 
the recorded mortgage, while in this case it was 
based on an unrecorded collateral agreement 
snuggled to the bosoms of the mortgagor and mort-
gagee, without any opportunity for the materialmen 
to take a looksee. 
The cases are not the same. In Utah Savings, mater-
ialmen could rely on the record. In our present case 
the main opinion charges materialmen with notice 
of an unrecorded, independent agreement. The re-
corded mortgage in Utah Savings said advancement 
of moneys by the mortgagee was obligatory. The 
unrecorded collateral agreement in the present case 
clearly was *414 not obligatory, but volitional. A 
materialman may not deliver a two-by-four piece of 
plywood if he knew he could not rely on the recor-
ded promise of the mortgagee to pay the mortgagor 
as represented, but would be bound by a secret, un-
recorded agreement that would permit the mort-
gagee to cancel the recorded promise five minutes 
after it was recorded, an incident beyond the ken of 
a materialman. To conclude otherwise does not dig-
nify the recording act. 
Utah 1967. 
Western Mortg. Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Const. 
Co. 
18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BRAFFITS CREEK ESTATES, INC., a Utah 
limited liability corporation; OMNIA 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; 
CRESCENT PROPERTIES, LLC, a Nevada 
limited liability company; ANB FINANCIAL 
N.A., an Arkansas National Association; 
KENNEDY FUNDING, INC., a New Jersey 
corporation; R&W EXCAVATING, INC., a 
Utah corporation; SCHWAB SALES, LLC, 
an Arizona limited liability company; and 
John Does 1-5, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT KENNEDY 
FUNDING, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080500072 
1 Judge John J. Walton 
On June 10, 2009, Defendant Kennedy Funding, Inc. ("ICFI"), moved for summary 
judgment and filed a supporting memorandum ("KFI Mem. in Supip." or "KFI's Supporting 
Memorandum"). On July 8, Plaintiff A-T Asphalt Paving, Inc., filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment and acombined memorandum opposing KFFs motion and supporting its 
own ("PL Comb. Mem."). On July 17, KFI filed a combined memorandum further supporting its 
motion and opposing Plaintiffs, and requested that its motion be submitted for decision ("KFI 
Comb. Mem.")- On July 31, Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion ("PI. 
Reply"). On September 8, the Court heard oral argument on the motions. Having considered the 
parties' written and oral arguments, and the relevant law, the Court now denies KFFs motion and 
grants Plaintiffs motion for the reasons set forth below. 
BACKGROUND 
Except as noted, the facts below are undisputed. 
KFI's Statement of Facts 
1, The properties that are the subject of this dispute are located in Iron County, Utah, and 
are more particularly described as follows: All of lots 1 through 240 of 3200 SUBDIVISION, 
PHASE 2, according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Iron County Recorder. 
Parcel numbers: D-0223-0002-0001 through D-0223-0002-0240 ("3200 Phase 2M)> 
2, In September 1985, the plat for 3200 Phase 2 was made, acknowledged, and recorded 
with the Iron County Recorder. A certified copy of this plat, with the corporate 
acknowledgment, corporate dedication of all streets and easements, county acceptance, and 
signature of the Iron County Attorney, is attached as Exhibit A to KFFs Supporting 
Memorandum. 
3. At all relevant times, Defendant Braffits Creek Estates, LLC ("Braffits Creek"), was 
the owner of 3200 Phase 2. 
4. At all relevant times, Defendant Omnia Development, hie. ("Omnia"), was the general 
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contractor relating to work being performed on 3200 Phase 2. 
5. In May 2007, KFI loaned the amount of $28,860,000.00 to Braffits Creek. This loan 
was secured by a trust deed relating to certain real property, including 3200 Phase 2. This trust 
deed was recorded on May 31, 2007, with the Iron County Recorder as Entry no. 553726, Book 
1090, beginning page 875. 
6. Plaintiff executed a Subcontract Agreement with Omnia dated August 15,2007, for 
"installation of 2.5" of hot mix asphalt on all roadways in the Project" As defined in the 
Subcontract Agreement, '"Project* is Phase 2.1 of Braffits Mountain, legally described as 3200 
Subdivision, Phase II, Iron County, Utah, lots 74 thru 83, 117 thru 130,142 thru 156, 161 thru 
177,187 thru 202, and 210 thru 216."1 
7. Beginning in August 2007, Plaintiff paved a portion of road within 3200 Phase 2, but 
was never compensated for this work. 
1
 Plaintiff admits this fact, but asserts that "the Subcontract Agreement was not executed 
on August 15,2007, bu t . . . at a later time at the request of Omnia... on the representation that 
it was required in order for [Plaintiff] to be paid for the paving work on [3200 Phase 2]." 
"Plaintiff further disputes the legal conclusion that the project was limited to 'Phase 2.T and 
alleges that that language was used after the fact to protect against Plaintiff s potential lien. 
Finally, Plaintiff disputes the implication that work done in 2006 and 2007, before [KFI] 
recorded its trust deed, did not improve 'Phase 2.1' within the meaning of Utah's mechanic's lien 
statute even if some-although not all-work done during that period of time was off site." As an 
example, Plaintiff avers that "the road [it] paved in 2006 leading to phase 2.1 had no other 
destination but phase 2.1 and thus improved the value of phase 2.1 lots even though that work 
was off site." PL Comb. Mem. at 3-4. 
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8. In December 2007, Plaintiff filed with the Iron County Recorder's Office a lien notice 
for the amount due of $652,114.40, as entry no. 00564739. This notice was filed to include all 
lots within 3200 Phase 2. 
Plaintiffs Statement of Additional Facts ("PI. St. Add. Facts") 
1. The original developer of 3200 Phase 2 dedicated the roads within the subdivision to 
Iron County when the subdivision plat was recorded in 1985. However, Iron County has never 
accepted the roads in 3200 Phase 2 for county maintenance because the roads were not built to 
county standards. Iron County consistently told Braffits Creek that the 3200 Phase 2 roads would 
not be accepted for county maintenance. 
2. Prior to the improvements by Braffits Creek, the roads were unimproved roads 
accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck. 
3. This fact statement has apparently been withdrawn. (KFI objected to it on hearsay 
grounds, and Plaintiff omitted it in its reply memorandum.)2 
4. The pavement provided by Plaintiff was an essential part of the development plan of 
3200 Phase 2. 3200 Phase 2 was planned as a high-end mountain community and Braffits Creek 
planned on selling the lots at a premium as they would be improved mountain lots with utilities. 
Without the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working financially.3 
2
 The omitted fact statement alleged that, "[a]t some time during 2005, Braffits Creek 
informed Stephen Piatt, the Iron County engineer, that it wished to make improvements within 
[3200 Phase 2], which improvements would include the paving of the roads within the 
subdivision." 
3
 Plaintiff has supported these statements by references to the affidavit and deposition 
testimony of Mr. Barnhart. KFI argues that "[t]hese allegations lack evidentiary foundation, as 
4 
5. Because the 3200 Phase 2 subdivision plat had been accepted in 1985, none of the 
modern requirements for accepting a subdivision plat were imposed on the original developer. 
6. Iron County did not request or contract with any group, entity, or individual to make 
improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. 
7. The improvements of the 3200 Phase 2 roads were not done pursuant to the 
Procurement Code, Utah Code section 63G-1-101 et seq., or any request or award of any contract 
by the County. 
8. Stephen R. Piatt, the Iron County engineer, did not know that Braffits Creek would 
actually cause the roads to be paved until he saw the road construction happening. 
9. Iron County issued no permits for improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. Iron 
County did not inspect the roads. 
10. Iron County has not received a bond or any financial guarantee for the 3200 Phase 2 
roads. 
11. Although the 3200 Phase 2 roads were dedicated to Iron County in the 1985 plat 
map, Iron County did not consider the road improvement from an ATV trail to a paved road with 
underground utilities an Iron County project but instead viewed it as a private project to benefit 
Mr. Bamhart simply opines as to the development plans of another entity, Braffits Creek." KFI 
Comb. Mem. at 3. Plaintiff says that Mr. Barnhart's personal knowledge of such plans is 
demonstrated by the fact that 1) "Omnia was the managing contractor for site development and 
ofp-site development of Braffits Creek"; 2) "[Mr.] Barnliart's specific employment at Omnia was 
to 'organize [the] subcontractors, to do all the infrastructure for the project and to supervise the 
installation of [that] infrastructure*"; and 3) "[Mr.] Bamhart worked directly for James Fales, the 
same owner of Braffits Creek." In short, "[Mr.] Bamhart was not simply opining as to the 
development plans of another entity, but was actually employed to carry out the development 
plans and has personal knowledge of them," PL Reply at 2. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 
5 
3200 Phase 2 and the owner of that subdivision. 
12. Some of the road that was paved by Plaintiff is not located on property dedicated in 
the 1985 plat as a public roadway, but was instead located in private property owned by Braffits 
Creek. The intent was to amend the plat after improvements were made.4 
13. This fact statement is insufficiently supported to be considered.5 
4
 Plaintiff has supported these statements by references to the affidavit testimony of Mr. 
Woolsey and Mr. Barnliart. KFI again challenges foundation, arguing that Mr. Barnhart's 
affidavit testimony here "consists simply of an unsupported conclusion," and that Mr. Woolsey's 
affidavit testimony is unsupported because he "was a surveyor; he did not engineer the roads 
within [3200 Phase 2]" and "'never provided any vertical control work for the existing roads.'" 
KFI Comb. Mem. at 6. Plaintiff stresses that Mr. Barnhart's affidavit states that it is based on 
personal knowledge, and notes that "[Mr.] Woolsey was the vice-president of InSite Engineering 
at the time InSite Engineering was retained to do survey work and other engineering work related 
to [3200 Phase 2]," and Woolsey's testimony is supported "with an AutoCAD drawing that was 
produced in conjunction with his work, and shows where the paved road varies from the 
dedicated road." Finally, citing Mr. Woolsey's deposition testimony, Plaintiff states that he 
"personally located the centerline of the existing road, lots corners, and conducted a survey of the 
property, giving him more than a sufficient basis to testify as to the location of the roadway." PL 
Reply at 3. Again, KFFs challenge is rejected. Even if Mr. Barnhart's affidavit fails to establish 
his competence to testify about the location of the pavement relative to the platted road, Mr. 
Woolsey's is clearly adequate. He is a surveyor who actually located the centerline of the platted 
road and certain existing property comers. 
5
 The omitted statement of paragraph 13 is: "Moreover, Plaintiff paved several private 
driveways to different lots within 3200 Phase 2." This statement is supported by reference to Mr. 
Barnhart's affidavit, which is equally unspecific. KFI argues that this evidence would not be 
admissible at trial, and is therefore insufficient on summary judgment, because "Plaintiff has 
provided no evidence as to what lots it purportedly paved, the cost of such work, or when such 
work was performed." Additionally, KFI "denies these allegations, as they are inconsistent with 
Plaintiffs Subcontract Agreement, which provides only for 'installation of 2.5" of hot mix 
asphalt on all roadways in the Project/" KFI Comb. Mem. at 6-7. Plaintiff rests on Mr. 
Barnhart's employment with Omnia, "the managing contractor for both onsite and offsite 
development"; the long hours he worked "from August, 2005 through about November, 2007"; 
and his alleged personal knowledge. The Court agrees with KFFs position that this statement is 
inadmissible due to Plaintiffs failure to identify any of the lots where driveways were allegedly 
paved. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
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14. Based on the default of the property owner, Braffits Creek, and the developer, 
Omnia, on September 18, 2008, the Court entered judgment for the value of the work and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $732,029.96. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties' competing summary judgment motions are predicated on the same basic 
issues, so this decision addresses the issues rather than the motions. 
Utah Code section 38-1-1 's exclusion of public improvements from 
the mechanics3 lien statute does not make the paving of dedicated 
streets pursuant to a private contract nonlienable. 
Beginning with the premise that Utah's mechanics' lien law is expressly inapplicable "to 
any public building, structure, or improvement," Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, and noting that 
platted roads constitute public property, see id. § 17-27a-607(l),6 KFI argues that Plaintiffs work 
paving the platted roads was a nonlienable public improvement as a matter of law. KFI cites a 
number of cases from other jurisdictions holding that public property is not subject to mechanics' 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."). C£ Tripp v, Vaughn. 747 
P.2d 1051,1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (existence of a roadway "was not a material factual issue" 
at trial where "[t]he evidence regarding the existence of a roadway was scant and was not 
seriously disputed by respondent," and in any event, "insufficient evidence was submitted to 
allow the court to find that the roadway was lienable work" because "[tjhere was no indication in 
the evidence as to who constructed the roadway or whether they would be entitled to a lien on the 
property"). 
6
 Utah Code section 17-27a-607(l) provides: "Plats, when made, acknowledged, and 
recorded according to the procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets 
and other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for the public for 
the uses named or intended in those plats." 
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liens. See Hvdro Conduit Corp. v. American-First Title & Trust Co.. 808 P,2d 712. 716 (10th 
Cir. 1986); North Bav Construction. Inc. v. City of Petaluma. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455,462 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006); City of Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co.. 940 P.2d 393, 396 (Colo. 
1997); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Improv. Co.. 332 P.2d 892, 893 (Colo. 
1958); Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena. 155 P.3d 952, 958 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
In response, Plaintiff does not challenge the proposition that mechanics' liens are not 
allowed on public property or for public improvements, but denies the applicability of that rule 
here. Plaintiff argues that Utah Code section 38-1-1 "is meant to address public construction 
projects as well as to protect public property from liens/' PL Comb. Mem. at 10 (citing Cox 
Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction. 754 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). In Cox 
Rock, the Court of Appeals explained that, because "subcontractors and suppliers are precluded 
under the mechanic's lien statute from placing a lien on 'any public building, structure or 
improvement,'" "suppliers and subcontractors have principally looked for protection to the 
second device, namely that of the payment bond, when providing labor or supplies for 
construction projects contracted for by governmental entities''' Id at 674 (emphasis added). 
Observing that its lien is not on public property, and that the work on which the lien is based was 
performed pursuant to a private contract rather than under any agreement with Iron County, 
Plaintiff argues that the work done here is not properly characterized as a public improvement. 
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Utah cases have explained that section 38-1-1 protects 
against liens on public property, see Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
1986) (noting that "the materialman is precluded under U.C.A., 1953, § 38-1-1 from placing a 
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lien on public property") (emphasis added and footnote omitted), and against liens arising from 
the provision of work or supplies under public contracts. See Western Coating v. Gibbons & 
Reed Co.» 788 P.2d 503, 503-04 (Utah 1990) ("We have reasoned that since mechanic's lien 
protection is not available in public contracts, 'performance bonds are required on public 
projects to provide substitute protection for laborers and material providers.*") (quoting CECO v; 
Concrete Specialists. Inc., 772 P.2d 967,970 (Utah 1989)); Cox Rock, 754 P.2d at 674. 
Neither of these circumstances is present here. Although the work here was technically 
performed on public property (or at least on property that was ultimately intended to be public),7 
no lien has been filed on any public property. Rather, Plaintiff filed its lien on all of the lots 
within 3200 Phase 2, which are privately owned by Braffits Creek. The lien did not arise from 
the performance of a public contract, but of a private one, the purpose of which was to enhance 
the value of Braffits Creek's private property. Although the public undeniably benefitted from 
the paving of a previously unpaved public road, the Court would have to close its eyes to the 
facts to categorize the paving as a public improvement. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how calling the paving project a public improvement 
would serve the legislative puipose of section 38-1-1. KFI itself asserts that "[t]his section 
codifies the common law exemption of public property from mechanics [sic] liens, the puipose 
of which was 'to preserve essential public services and functions while protecting those who 
7
 It is undisputed that, insofar as Plaintiffs paving did not exactly follow the plat, "[t]he 
intent was to amend the plat [to reflect such deviations] after improvements were made." PL St. 
Add. Facts f 12. 
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benefit from public services and facilities."' KFI Mem. in Supp. at 4 (quoting City of 
Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 940 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997) (internal citation 
omitted)). Accepting this as a correct summary of the section's purpose, there is no reason to 
believe such purpose will be defeated or undermined in any way by the allowance of Plaintiff s 
lien. As Plaintiff points out, it has not liened the paved streets themselves and enforcement of its 
lien therefore poses no threat of interference with public passage thereon. PL Comb. Mem. at 13 
(quoting J.R. Christ Constr. Co. v. Willette Assocs.. 221 A.2d 538, 542 (NJ. 1966) ("It has been 
suggested that allowing mechanics' liens for the construction of sewers under public streets 
would result in interference with the public's right of way if and when such liens were enforced. 
We think this view is based on a misconception. Enforcement of liens arising from the 
installation of sewers would not result in the sale of sti'eets for private use. Rather, such liens are 
enforced by selling the land and buildings abutting the street, the land and buildings which 
benefit from the improvements.")). 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-3, the paving of dedicated 
roads pursuant to a private contract entered into by the owner of 
private property abutting the roads and for the purpose of enhancing 
the value of such property gives rise to a Hen on such property. 
The parties emphasize different parts of Utah Code section 38-1-3 to support their 
respective positions on the issue of whether a lien for the work done on the roads may attach to 
the abutting property. That section provides: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
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designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property. 
Pointing to the final sentence of this section, which limits the attachment of liens "to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property/' KPI argues that no lien for the work done on the 
roads may attach to the abutting lots because "[t]he 'property' paved belonged to the county, not 
Braffits Creek; such work was not performed upon the abutting lots/* KFI Mem. in Supp. at 5-6. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, focuses on the allowance of a lien for the "improvement to 
any premises in any manner," which Hen shall be "upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service " Because the work Plaintiff performed concerned the abutting 
lots, Plaintiff argues that a lien on such lots is appropriate, and is not an "attempt[] to attach any 
more interest than BrafQts Creek Estates, LLC has in the property that was directly benefitted by 
Plaintiffs work." PI. Comb. Mem. at 18. 
KFI responds that "the Utah Supreme Court has twice held that the phrase 'concerning 
which' in the mechanics [sic] lien statute applies only to architects and engineers and the like 
who provide drawings and specifications, i.e., where the laborer is not physically present on the 
property when the services are provided but the work itself is used to malce the improvements on 
the property/' KFI Comb. Mem. at 12, and quotes the following excerpt from Zions First 
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National Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387 (Utah 1970): 
From the history and purpose of the statute it appears that the words "upon or 
concerning which" were simply intended to be generally descriptive of the manner 
in which certain work and services are performed. For example, work done by 
contractors or laborers upon an oil well or building is done upon the property, 
whereas, the services of architects and engineers is work which maybe regarded 
as done c<with respect to" or "concerning" the property. 
Id at 388-89 (quoting Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1959)). 
KFI repeats the observations made in Davis that section 38-1-3 incorporates provisions 
from what were, prior to 1933, four distinct sections; that the pre-1933 section relating to 
architects, engineers, and artisans allowed a lien for ccbestow[ing] labor in whole or part, 
describing, illustrating, or superintending such structure of work done or to be done, or in any 
part connected therewith"; and that, u[i]n the consolidation with other sections the cumbersome 
emphasized language was deleted and the more general term 'or concerning' was inserted as a 
shorter substitute." Davis, 341 P.2d at 210. KFI concludes: 
Thus, the phrase "concerning the property" is a descriptive term only, designed to 
provide a lien to those who work directly on the improvement that is on-site, but 
the manner in which they perform that work is off-site. 
Plaintiffs work on the dedicated roads was not performed "upon" adjacent lots, 
and Plaintiff is not entitled to circumvent this requirement by attempting to fit 
within a provision reserved for architects and engineers. 
KFI Comb. Mem. at 13. 
In reply, Plaintiff denies that the phrase "concerning which" is applicable only to 
architects and engineers. It stresses that the excerpt above, which is found in both the Carlson 
and Davis cases, and which explains how the phrase should be understood, uses the term, "[fjor 
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example/' when saying that "the services of architects and engineers is work which may be 
regarded as done 'with respect to' or 'concerning' the property," indicating that the "concerning 
which" language does not apply exclusively to members of these professions. 
Plaintiff correctly notes that whether the "concerning which" language applied to the lien 
rights of claimants other than architects and engineers was not a holding or an issue in Carlson. 
which involved the work of an architect. PL Reply at 8. It summarizes Davis as holding "that 
the cost of transporting a drilling rig to the site of an oil well was not lienable," and says that "[a] 
closer look at [that] case reveals that the court's reasoning was concerned more with the 
remoteness of the benefit created to the land when the drilling rig was transported to the site." 
PI. Reply at 8-9. Plaintiff recounts facts relevant to this aspect of the case, and distinguishes 
them from those present here as follows: 
The property owner entered into a contract to have his land drilled at a certain 
price per foot. The drilling company then hired another company to transport its 
drilling rig to the property. The owner of the drilling rig sought a lien for the 
transportation cost. The court stated that interpreting the "concerning which" 
language too broadly could result in opening *Hhe door to unforeseeable risks for 
the property owner." However, this is obviously not a risk in the case before the 
Court. In this case, the owner of the property is the party that requested the 
paving work and having its property liened for the cost of the work was not an 
unforeseeable risk. Further, the fact that the roads were paved providing access to 
abutting lots, is open and apparent to all lot owners. This is not a fact like 
transporting a drilling rig, that may occur without the owner being aware that a 
separate bill or charge over and above the cost of drilling the well, might result. 
PL Reply at 9 (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff is correct in identifying the foreseeability of the risks for the property owner as a 
factor in the Davis court's decision, 341 P.2d at 210, and the Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
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conclusion-for the reasons Plaintiff has given-that this concern is absent here. C£ Graco Fishing 
& Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074,1077 (Utah 1988) (distinguishing Davis 
on this ground, and holding, "in light of the purpose of the mechanic's lien statute, preventing a 
windfall to property owners at the expense of equipment, material, and labor suppliers/' that 
"reasonable transportation charges [for rental equipment] are lienable"), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in Trench Shoring Servs, v. Saratoga Springs Dev., L.L.C.. 57 P.3d 241, 
245 (Utah Ct App. 2002). 
On the other hand, the Court agrees with KFI that, under Davis, the "concerning which" 
language of the statute may not operate to give contractors, subcontractors, etc. lien rights. The 
court clearly found the phrase "upon or concerning which" to be descriptive rather than 
prescriptive. See Davis, 341 P.2d at 210 (**Prom the history and purpose of the statute it appears 
that the words 'upon or concerning which' were simply intended to be generally descriptive of 
the manner in which certain work and services are performed."). 
However, in reaching this conclusion, as KFI observed at oral argument, the Davis court 
relied, in part, on language in section 38-1-3 that expressly limited the lien rights of contractors 
and subcontractors:8 
8
 The version of section 38-1-3 applied.in Davis provided, in pertinent part: 
[1] Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing labor upon, or 
furnishing materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or addition to, 
or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land; [2] all foundry 
men and boiler makers; [3] all persons performing labor or furnishing materials 
for the construction, repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting 
works; [4] all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, 
14 
A difficulty with [the lien claimant's] argument that the latter phrase ["or 
concerning which"] should be given such a broad application to the entire statute 
is that doing so would be at variance with the tenor of these statutes and 
particularly the words creating a lien for labor and materials. The lien given to 
contractors and laborers specifies the "performing labor upon> or furnishing 
materials to be used in . . . or repair... building... or improvement upon [the] 
land." If the more general phrase "or concerning which" were controlling as to 
that class of lien claimants, the specific language requiring the work or materials 
to be upon the property would be idle verbiage. 
341 P.2d at 210 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to KFFs assertion at oral argument that the relevant statutory language remains 
the same today, the current statute omits, among other tilings, the preposition "upon" emphasized 
in the above exceipt, and makes a lien available to "[contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, Since Davis specifically explained that 
the now-omitted language "requir[ed] the work or materials to be upon the property," 341 P.2d at 
210, the Legislature's decision to remove such language appears to reflect an intent to remove 
development, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or 
gas well, or deposit [5] and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of 
cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by 
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.... 
341 P.2d at 209 (bracketed subdivisions added in Davis). 
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this requirement. 
Moreover, doubts in this regard maybe resolved by resorting to the purpose of the 
legislation in question. See John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules. Inc.. 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) ("When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and application of a statute, it is 
appropriate to look to its purpose in the light of its background and history, and also to the effect 
it will have in practical application.") (quoting Davis. 341 P.2d at 209). 'The purpose and intent 
of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform 
the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement," Sill v. Hart, 162 P.3d 1099,1102-03 (Utah 2007) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted), and "[l]ien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose." Id. at 1103 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Reading section 38-1-3 through this lens, there can be little question that the statute's 
current language, which covers the "improvement to any premises in any manner" Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added), is broad enough to include improvements not literally 
performed on those premises but performed adjacent thereto for the benefit of such premises and 
at the request of the owner of the premises.9 See John Wagner, 797 P.2d at 1125-26 (noting that, 
under Utah's mechanics' lien law, "the owner of the premises, at whose instance and for whose 
benefit the improvement is made, has been the one most likely to suffer loss") (citation 
9
 As Plaintiff has argued, its lien only attaches to Braffits Creek's ownership interest in 
the property liened, and is therefore consistent with the requirement that it "shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. 
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omitted),10 
This appears to be a matter of first impression in Utah, However, the Supreme Court has 
previously affirmed the lienability of work done largely, though not entirely, on property other 
than the property liened. In First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs.. 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the court upheld the determination that the mechanics' liens held by those 
who "performed labor or furnished materials on various condominium units on the property" 
related back to the work done by one Child Brothers, Inc. ("Child Bros."), which "consisted of 
locating existing lines and putting in pipeline, water and sewer systems, and storm drains." IcL at 
523. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the subsequent liens, "which relate[d] to specific 
structures," could not "relate back to the date of the commencement of Child Bros.' work," 
which the plaintiffs "characterize^]... as 'off-site improvements/" id. at 524, the court 
explained: 
"The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect those who have added directly to the 
value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959). The 
broad language, "improvement to any premises in any manner," encompasses the 
instant case where sewer and water systems were installed on the subject property. 
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the material or labor 
be furnished solely on a building structure or that the work be performed solely on 
the lot on which a building is being erected. We agree with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, which stated in J. R. Christ Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs.. 
47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), that a contractor should not be barred from 
10
 Regarding the effect "in practical application" of allowing such a lien, John Wagner. 
797 P,2d at 1125, the Court has already stated that the foreseeability problems addressed in Davis 
are not present here, where the owner of the property liened specifically requested the 
improvements for the benefit of the property liened. 
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enjoying the benefits of the mechanics* lien statute where his work not only 
enhances the value of the developer's land, but is also necessary to make 
residences to be built on such property habitable. The court held that where a 
developer engages the contractor to install a sewer system for a subdivision 
project, the contractor, if he complies with required statutory procedures, is 
entitled to a mechanics' lien against the developer's property for the cost of labor 
and materials furnished. The New Jersey Court cited Ladue Contracting Co. v. 
Land Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. App. 1960), in emphasizing the 
fact that water and sewer systems are essential to the comfortable and convenient 
use of dwellings and that it would be "turn[ing] the clock back to another century'' 
to hold that such improvements are outside the terms of the lien statute. (Id. at 
585). 
Id, at 524-25. 
It is true, as KFI contends, that the facts ofZundel vary significantly from those of the 
instant case. First, unlike here, in Zundel there was at least some work done on the liened 
property. This was recognized in the court's holding that "[i]t is not necessaiy to the attacliment 
of a mechanics' lien that the material or labor be furnished solely on a building structure or that 
the work be perfonned solely on the lot on which a building is being erected." 600 P.2d at 525 
(emphasis added). In contrast, all of the work on which Plaintiffs lien is based was performed 
on properly other than the property liened.n Second, the improvement at issue here-street 
paving-is not, strictly speaking, like water and sewer systems, which are "necessary to make 
residences to be built on [the] property habitable." Id. 
Although, for these reasons, the instant case does not come within the confines of the 
1 ]
 Plaintiff has shown that the pavement it laid did not precisely follow the road as 
platted, and argues that its work was therefore done, to some extent, on the private property 
liened. The Court is not persuaded that the technical deviation from the plat is a material fact, 
especially considering that "[t]he intent was to amend the plat [to reflect such deviations] after 
improvements were made." PL St. Add. Facts f 12. 
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Zundel holding, nothing in that case suggests that it represents the outer limits of Utah's 
mechanics' lien law. On the contrary,, the rationale of the Ladue case quoted in Zundel extended, 
in Ladue itself, to the work of road paving. See 337 S.W.2d at 585 ("It is much too late in these 
modern times to embrace arguments that the items in [the plaintiffs] account ought not to be 
treated as essential to the comfortable and convenient use of the dwellings. Research has not 
discovered any Missouri precedent dealing with streets as subject or not subject to the lien 
statutes. But dwellings without streets for ingress and egress> without driveways, or without 
efficient sewer systems are just no longer constructed in urban areas. To hold that the items of 
[the plaintiffs] account are outside the terms of the lien statute would be to turn the clock back 
to another century.") (emphasis added). 
Other authorities likewise regard the allowance of liens for offsite water, sewer, and street 
paving work as sharing the same animating principles. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 
111 ^ Construction that is essential to the convenient and comfortable use of a city lot is an 
improvement to the lot, and is an 'appurtenance' to the lot, even if it is outside the physical 
boundaries. Thus, liens have been allowed on property for pipes laid in the street for water or gas 
mains and sewers, as well as sidewalks and street paving, irrespective of whether the fee of the 
street is in the owner of the abutting lot.") (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); 5-38 Powell 
on Real Property § 38.14 ("Even if the improvement, such as sidewalks, a sewer line, or street 
paving, is not directly located on the owner's property, a lien has been recognized in the abutting 
owner's property that is directly impacted by these appurtenant improvements.") (emphasis 
added and footnote omitted). 
19 
Particularly in light of the undisputed facts that 1) the roads paved by Plaintiff were, prior 
to such paving, "accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck/' PI, St. Add. 
Facts f 2, and 2) "[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working 
financially/' PL St. Add, Facts f 4, the Court concludes that allowing Plaintiffs lien here is 
proper. The improvement on which the lien is based not only directly impacted the value of the 
liened property, but, for the anticipated scale of development on the property, it was also 
"essential to the comfortable and convenient use of [the property]." Zundel, 600 P.2d at 525.12 
Finally, the Court distinguishes the only two arguably relevant cases cited by KFI. The 
first is Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Imnrov. Co., 332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958), 
in which an individual contracted to have paving done that ran over three separate pieces of 
property, which were respectively owned by the public, himself, and a third-party. When the 
subcontractor who performed the work was not paid, he filed a lien on the individual's land for 
the full value of the work. The trial court allowed the hen, but reduced it to an amount reflecting 
the value of the portion of the road traversing the individual's property. 
12
 KFI points to evidence that the majority of mountain subdivisions in southern Utah lack 
paved roads, see KFI Comb. Mem, at 3 (citing PL Comb. Mem. Exh. 4, Barnhart Deposition 
8:21-22), but it is not clear that the accessibility of those subdivisions is as limited as was the 
property here prior to Plaintiffs improvements, or that the financial viability of such 
subdivisions is comparably dependent on improvements like paved roads. In fact, Mr. Bamhart's 
testimony suggests the reverse; he mentioned the lack of paved roads in most southern Utah 
mountain subdivisions as part of an attempt to show why the planned development of the 
property here 'Svas a very high-end development for this area." PL Comb, Mem. Exh. 4, 
Barnhart Deposition 8:13-14. In contrasting the planned development of this property with that 
of other southern Utah subdivisions, he testified that, in addition to lacking paved roads, "[m]any 
of the subdivisions in southern Utah don't have water to the lots," and "[a] lot of them don't have 
electricity and so forth." PL Comb. Mem. Exh. 4, Barnhart Deposition 8:24-9:3. 
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In its combined memorandum, KFI presents Shelby Contracting Co. v, Pizitz. 231 So. 2d 
743 (Ala. 1970), in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that an improvement done upon a 
public street pursuant to a private contract with the owner of the abutting property was not 
li enable against the abutting property. Little more detail is given about the facts of the case, but 
again, the law applied clearly varies from that of Utah. 
After quoting the applicable statute, which required that the work or materials supporting 
a lien be provided upon the land liened,14 the court framed the issue as "whether or not an 
improvement, such as curbing, paving, or pipe, which is actually upon the street, is to be 
regarded as being upon the lot which abuts on the street." LI at 745. After surveying the law 
from nine other jurisdictions, as well as its own related cases and statutes, the court joined those 
courts answering this question in the negative. Id at 750. 
Although the cases discussed raised a number of issues, the primary difference the court 
noted between jurisdictions allowing a lien for work on a sidewalk or street to attach to abutting 
property and those denying such a lien was that those permitting it held that the owner of the 
14
 As quoted by the court, the relevant statute provided; 
Every mechanic, person, firm, or corporation who shall do or perform any work, 
or labor upon, or furnish any material, fixture, engine, boiler, or machinery for any 
building or improvement on land, or for repairing, altering, or beautifying the 
same, under or by virtue of any contract with the owner or proprietor thereof, or 
his agent, architect, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor, upon complying with the 
provisions of this article, shall have a lien therefor on such building or 
improvements and on the land on which the same is situated, to the extent in 
ownership of all the right, title, and interest therein of the owner or proprietor 
231 So. 2d at 744 (emphasis added). 
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abutting property owned a fee interest to the center of the street.15 The court observed that, by 
statute in Alabama, acknowledging and recording a plat resulted in "a conveyance in fee simple 
of such portion of the premises platted as are marked,.. on such plat . . . as donated . . . for any 
street," and that, while "[i]t is true that upon abandonment of the street, absolute ownership 
thereof will then finally vest in the owner of abutting lot," icL at 750, unless and until that 
happened, "the interest of the lot owner in the 'street' is merely the right to enter it and to use it 
in common with the rest of the public." IcL Hence, "the lot owner's interest in the street, at 
most, is a contingent expectancy dependent on an event which may never occur. We are of 
opinion that the better view is that the lot owner's interest in the 'street' does not make the 
15
 The court quoted language referring to such ownership in all but one of the cases cited 
by the lien claimant there. See 231 So. 2d at 745-46 (quoting Lewis v. Roach Manigan Paving 
Co.. 184 S.W. 680, 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ("But whatever the rule may be in other states, we 
are of the opinion that, as it is settled in this state that a deed to a lot fronting on a public street 
and calling for such street, or else describing the lot by reference to a plat which shows that the 
lot abuts upon the street and was laid out with reference thereto, carries with it a fee-simple title 
to the center of the street, in the absence of some restriction in the deed, it follows inevitably that 
an improvement, such as the one in controversy in the present suit, was an improvement upon the 
entire lot, including that part which fronts upon the street and upon which buildings are erected.") 
(emphasis added); Leiper & Mills v. Minnig. 86 S.W. 407,409 (Ark. 1905) ("Now, while the 
general public have an easement in sidewalks, and while the municipality controls them for the 
purpose of preserving this easement, yet the fee, under the law, is in the owner of the land 
abutting the public streets to the center of the street, and this ownership is absolute, subject only 
to the rights of the public to enjoy its easement over it, and to the public power of the 
municipality, as the agent of the public, to preserve this easement or highway.") (emphasis 
added); Ladue Contracting Co. v. Land Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Mo. Ct App. 
1960) (?Appellant owned the land to the center of the street on which his property abutted, 
subject to the easement in favor of the public") (emphasis added and citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The sole exception was Application of Bradwood Realty, Inc., 251 N.Y.S.2d 
315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), but the Shelby court categorized it with the others, apparently inferring 
that Bradwood was based on the same rationale as the others because Bradwood "quoted at 
length from the Ladue opinion." 231 So. 2d 746. 
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'street' a part of the abutting lot so that an improvement on the 'street5 is an improvement on the 
lot so as to make the lot subject to a lien for such improvement." 11 
Concededly, if the Court were required to answer the question posed in Shelbv-namelv. 
"whether or not an improvement, such as curbing, paving, or pipe, which is actually upon the 
street, is to be regarded as being upon the lot which abuts on the street/' id at 745-the Court 
would likely be compelled to reach the same conclusion reached there. As previously noted, 
Utah Code section 17-27a-607(l) provides: "Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded 
according to the procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and other 
public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for the public for the uses 
named or intended in those plats.'* Additionally, as KFI points out, Utah law, like Alabama's, 
"holds that an abutting owner owns, at best, a 'reversionary interest' in a street," which interest is 
contingent and conditional^]" KFI Comb. Mem. at 11 (citing Ash v. State. 572 P.2d 1374,1378 
(Utah 1977) ("It should be observed that an abutting owner would own a reversionary interest in 
the street to its center. When the state took the property in fee simple, it would also be expected 
to take this reversionary interest...."); White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah 1952) 
("[Upon dedication,] the county or city authorities are vested with the fee in the streets. Such 
ownership carries with it the right to use it for the enumerated purposes when, in their discretion, 
it bests serves the public interest. If the street should cease to serve any public interest, it may be 
abandoned and, in that case, the right to the use and control of the roadway would revert to the 
abutting owner... .")). It may therefore not reasonably be concluded, under Utah law, that any 
part of the street is an extension of the abutting owner's property. 
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However, as previously stated, the current language of section 38-1-3 does not require, 
for the attachment of a hen, that work performed for the improvement of a lot be performed upon 
the lot itself Thus, the question asked and answered in Shelby is, unlike there, not dispositive 
here.16 Shelby itself recognizes that the division of authorities on the abutting property question 
is attributable to variations in the applicable statutory language. See 231 So. 2d at 745* Because 
the language and purpose of section 38-1-3 support Plaintiffs lien claim, and neither Utah 
precedents nor those of other states refute it, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is 
granted and KFFs summary judgment motion is denied.17 
16
 Further, two of the cases excerpted in Shelby that rejected a right to lien abutting 
property relied, in part, on the fact that the improvements on the street were made pursuant to 
local law and were therefore for a public benefit rather than a public one. See Coenen & Mentzer 
v. Staub, 36 N.W. 877, 877 (Iowa 1888) ("[N]or was [the sidewalk] made for the benefit of the 
owner, but of the public, and was constructed by the owner, as we presume, in obedience to some 
requirement of the town government"); Seeman v. Schultze. 28 S.E. 378, 379 (Ga. 1897) 
("Paving the sidewalk is an improvement to the public street and facilitates the passage of 
pedestrians in front of the lot, but it cannot be said in law that it improves the real estate. It is 
made as much or more for the benefit of the public than it is for the benefit of the owner of the 
lot,.. . Paving is usually regulated largely by the municipal government. It either paves the 
sidewalk or requires the owner of the lot to do so."). Presumably, the Shelby court included 
these excerpts in its decision because it considered this reasoning relevant to the matter before it. 
In this case, this factor weighs in the other direction. Braffits Creek had the paving done for its 
own benefit. Iron County did not request that it be done and took no part in getting it done. 
17
 KFI has also argued that Plaintiffs only remedies are a claim against Braffits Creek 
under Utah Code section 14-2-2(1) for failure to obtain a payment bond, and a contract claim 
against Omnia, both of which remedies Plaintiff has already obtained by virtue of the default 
judgments entered against Braffits Creek and Omnia in this case. This argument is rejected. KFI 
has not cited any authority establishing that Plaintiffs' right to the paper remedies it has obtained 
by default judgment disqualify it for the security provided by a mechanics' lien. KFI has also 
sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-18. Given the Court's 
decision to allow Plaintiffs lien, KFI is not entitled to its attorney fees under the section cited. 
Lastly, it is noted that, at oral argument, Plaintiff withdrew an objection it had previously made 
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ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. A-T Asphalt Paving, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted; and 
2. Kennedy Funding, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this Z?~ day of September, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
John J. Walton 
District Court Judge 
to KFI's standing in this matter. 
26 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 080500072 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: LEWIS P REECE 912 W 1600 S BLDG B STE 200 ST GEORGE, UT 
84770 
MAIL: BRADLEY M STRASSBERG 257 E 200 SOUTH STE 700 SALT LAKE CITY 
UT 84111 
Deputy dourt Clerk^ 
Page 1 (last) 
